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Autonomy or Community?
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Parental Obligation
Marsha Garrisont
The article examines this question: How much do parents owe their
children? It describes the historical development of the child support
obligation and current support "guidelines," mandated by Congress
with the hope of raising support levels. It utilizes several distributive
justice theories to evaluate the guidelines, concluding that they fail un-
der any approach. The article explains that all of the surveyed dis-
tributive justice theories lead to one of two support models. The
"Community Model" bases the support obligation on family member-
ship and mandates income sharing as a basic approach. The
"Autonomy Model" bases the support obligation on both the societal
burden produced by nonsupport and the nonsupporting parent's con-
tractual obligations to the custodial parent; it mandates public assis-
tance (or poverty) prevention and contract enforcement as basic goals.
The Article describes the results that the Community and Autonomy
models would achieve and evaluates available evidence bearing on the
choice of a model, including survey data on public attitudes toward the
support obligation, the extent to which each model is consistent with the
assumptions implicit in related areas of law, and the ability of each
model to meet the policy concerns that motivated the child support ini-
tiatives in the first place. It concludes that the Community Model is the
better choice.
How much do parents owe their children? Does parental obligation
derive primarily from the burdens that a child may impose on society
and on the other parent, or from parent's and child's joint membership
in a sharing community?
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Any society's answers to these questions will tell us a good deal
about its basic values and conception of family life. Our own society's
answers will also play a crucial role in determining the current well-
being and future prospects of half or more of our children; given
current rates of divorce and nonmarital childbearing, at least 50% of
American children, for some portion of their childhood years, are
expected to be eligible for child support from a nonresident parent.'
The results achieved by child support laws-and the conception of
parental obligation that underlies them-are important not only to
children and their parents, but to the public as well. Family dissolution
and nonsupport are currently major causes of children's poverty and
welfare dependence.2 Children in single-parent households are also
more likely to experience poor health, behavioral problems,
delinquency, and low educational attainment than are their peers in
intact families; as adults they have higher rates of poverty, early
childbearing, and divorce? While these outcomes do not result solely
from reduced economic status, this factor appears to be the most
important of the identifiable causes.4
1. Researchers currently estimate that half to three-quarters of children born in the late 1970s
or 1980s will spend some portion of their childhood years in a single-parent household. For a critical
review of the estimates, see DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM
FAMILY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY 69-71 (1993). As many as 90% of African-American
children will spend time in a single-parent family. See, e.g., ROBERT HAVEMAN & BARBARA
WOLFE, SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS: ON THE EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 19 n.2
(1994).
2. See, e.g., Mary Jo Bane, Household Composition and Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY:
WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 231 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds,, 1986)
(concluding from analysis of 1970s census data that "perhaps about 15% of all poverty could be
alleviated by more attention to the allocation of resources after household splits"); Greg J. Duncan &
Willard L. Rodgers, Longitudinal Aspects of Childhood Poverty, 50 J. MARRIAGE. & FAM. 1007, 1017
tbl.5 (1988) (concluding from analysis of 1968-82 census data that 14.9% of children's transitions into
poverty resulted from loss of a parent from the home). In 1993, 45% of AFDC entrants became
eligible for benefits as a result of marital separation or divorce. See U.S. CONGRESS, House OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 1994 GREEN BOOK: OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENTS PROGRAMS 451 tbl.10-50.
See also Peter J. Leahy et al., Time on Welfare: Why Do People Enter and Leave the System?, 54 AM.
J. ECON. & Soc. 33 (1995) (reporting change in family structure as the primary reason women enter
welfare system).
3. See HERNANDEZ, supra note 1, at 58-64; S. Wayne Duncan, Economic Impact of Divorce
on Children's Development: Current Findings and Policy Implications, 23 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 444, 451-53 (1994); Sara McLanahan, Intergenerational Consequences of Divorce: The
United States Perspective, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 285 (Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992) [hereinafter McLanahan,
Intergenerational Consequences]; Sara S. McLanahan et al., The Role of Mother-Only Families in
Reproducing Poverty, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 51
(Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991).
4. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HELPS, WHAT HURTS 3, 79-94 (1994) ("Low income-and the sudden drop in income that
often is associated with divorce is the single most important factor in children's lower achievement in
single-parent homes, accounting for about half of the disadvantage."); McLanahan, Intergenerational
Consequences, supra note 3, at 292-93, 298 (summarizing studies and concluding that "income
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Given the serious and costly consequences associated with low
support payments, it is not surprising that the interest of law makers and
the public has expanded along with the number of support-eligible
children. Beginning in 1979, the Census Bureau began to collect
biennial child support data. Its first national survey revealed what many
had already suspected: American child support laws were not
producing results that protected either children or the public. Only
three-fifths of women eligible to receive child support had obtained
support orders Only about half of those awarded support received full
payment.' The average value of child support paid7 was less than half of
what economists estimate as typical child-rearing costs8 and only 12% of
average male earnings for that year.9 Research at the state level also
documented considerable variation in award values, even among
families of similar size and socioeconomic characteristics. 0
explains more than half of the... [child outcome) variation across family types"). See also Duncan,
supra note 3 (reviewing research).
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY: 1978, at 3 tbl.A (Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 106, 1980) [hereinafter
1978 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT] (reporting that 59.1% of women survey respondents who had one or
more children under 21 years of age had been awarded support from an absent father in 1978).
6. See id. (reporting that, in 1978, 48.9% of women survey respondents who had been
awarded child support received full payment).
7. See id. at 3 tbl.B (reporting average value in 1978 of child support received as $1799).
8. See ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT 38-39 (1993) (estimates of average annual parental expenditure per child range
from $3245 to $4925 in 1985 dollars, or two to three times the average amount of child support due).
9. See id. at 35 tbl.2.7. Child support obligors report paying even smaller proportions of their
incomes in child support. See Cynthia Needles Fletcher, A Comparison of Incomes and Expenditures
of Male-Headed Households Paying Child Support and Female-Headed Households Receiving Child
Support, 38 FAM. RELATIONS 412,414 (1989) (reporting that 1985 male PSID respondents who had
paid child support paid, on average, 9.5% of their current incomes).
10. See, e.g., JOSEPH L LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR
NEGOTIATING-AND COLLECTING-A FAIR SETTLEMENT 12 (1986) (reporting that in random
Connecticut sample of fathers with one child who earned between $145 and $155 per week, support
ordered ranged from $10 to $60 per week); Ann Nichols-Casebolt et al., Reforming Wisconsin's Child
Support System, in STATE POLICY CHOICES: THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE 172, 176-77 tbl.9.2
(Sheldon Danziger & John F. Witte eds., 1988) (reporting that sample Wisconsin child support awards
ranged from zero to more than 100% of noncustodial father's income); Kenneth R. White & R.
Thomas Stone, Jr., A Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10
FAM. LQ. 75, 83-84 (1976) (reporting that, in Orange County, Florida, alimony and child support
awards to families in similar circumstances varied widely based on differing judicial philosophies);
Lucy Marsh Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment
and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DENY. LJ. 21 (1979)
(concluding that judicially ordered child support in Denver varied widely). But see Marsha Garrison,
How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74
N.C. L REV. 401, 491-92 & 492 n.315 (1996) (reporting that in New York sample of stipulated child
support awards, obligor's income, percentage of family income earned by custodial parent, number
of minor children, custodial parent's net property award, and case duration accounted for 44% of
case variation; among judicial awards obligor's income, decision year, number of minor children, and
the custody decision accounted for 54% of case variation); Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of
Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L REV.
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Over the past twenty years, both the federal and state governments
have enacted laws designed to improve this dismal record." While the
reform effort has altered many aspects of child support practice, the
most sweeping shift has been in the determination of support award
values. Traditional support laws urged consideration of the child's
needs, prior standard of living, and parental resources, but left to judicial
discretion the task of translating these factors into a dollars and cents
payment schedule. 2  Today, based on directives from Congress,13 each
state has adopted numerical guidelines governing the value of child
support. 4 While these guidelines need only establish a rebuttable
presumption as to the child support amount, deviation must be justified
in a written decision.' 5
While Congress adopted the numerical guidelines requirement with
the aim of significantly increasing award levels and decreasing award
variability, 6 available evidence suggests that these goals have not been
met. Awards calculated under existing guidelines do not appear to
differ dramatically from those produced under earlier discretionary
standards. 7 Many guidelines fail to ensure that children are protected
from poverty, even when parental income is adequate to meet that
goal. 8 Moreover, they often improve the living standard of the child
support obligor, while causing that of his child to plummet. 9 Today's
1133, 1164 (1988) (reporting that in sample of stipulated and judicial child support awards, number of
children, income of supporting parent, and couple's estimated net worth accounted for almost 50% of
variation in child support values).
11. The trend is not unique to the United States. See, e.g., 1. Thomas Oldham, Lessons from the
New English andAustralian Child Support Systems, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691 (1996).
12. For a description of traditional child support law, see HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 488-498 (Ist ed. 1968) [hereinafter CLARK, FIRST
EDITION].
13. See, e.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
14. For state-by-state descriptions of the guidelines, see DIANE DODSON & JOAN ENTMACHtER,
WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, REPORT CARD ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (1994);
JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A SUMMARY OF CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES (1990).
15. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2346
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1991)).
16. See Irwin Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Nonnative Standards in Family Law
Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24 FAM. LQ. 157, 160-62 (1990);
Robert G. Williams, An Overview of Child Support Guidelines in the United States, in CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES: THE NEXT GENERATION 15 (Margaret C. Haynes ed., 1994) [hereinafter NEXT
GENERATION].
17. See sources cited infra notes I I 1-1 16.
18. See sources cited infra notes 129-130.
19. See sources cited infra note 131.
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child support laws thus prefer the interests of the nonresident parent to
those of the child, the custodial parent, and the public. 2
Are these results fair? Are they compatible with contemporary
views on parental obligation, family relationships, and distributive
justice? Current guidelines offer no answers to these questions, as they
lack an articulated theory of the support obligation to ground their
design and justify their results.2 Most were derived from economic
models of household expenditure in intact families, not from a decision
about what income allocation would be fair in a divided family. The
literature on child support today thus focuses almost exclusively on
details'-child care costs, extraordinary medical expenses, joint
custody, extended visitation-without regard to basic goals or
principles.'
Nor are the right goals and principles immediately apparent.
Social theorists have seldom addressed either issues of justice within the
family or the extent of a parent's obligation to ensure that his children
do not burden the community. Although the classical social theorists
analyzed the relationship between family and society extensively,24 they
tended to view the parent-child relationship as one governed by altruism
rather than the constraints of formal justice.' Although this assumption
is clearly inadequate when applied to parents and children who live
20. For a similar view, see Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, Rationalizing Child-Support
Decisions, 85 Am. EcON. REV. 1241 (1995) (concluding, based on economic analysis, that implicit
weight attached to combined post-divorce welfare of custodial mother and child was significantly less
than that attached to father's welfare in most sample cases).
21. For similar views, see Laurie J. Bassi & Burt S. Barnow, Expenditures on Children and Child
Support Guidelines, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGmT. 478, 495 (1993) ("To determine if a given
guideline is fair, one must first ascertain the standard of fairness that is to be applied. Thus, we
recommend that states explicitly consider the fairness criteria they would like to attain."); David
Betson et al., Trade-Offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11 . POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 19
(1992) ("[C]hildren stand to gain if policy makers would address explicitly the trade-offs implicit in
child-support guidelines."); Andrea Giampetro, Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child
Support Payments: Stated Objectives, Practical Results, and Hidden Policies, 20 FAM. L.Q. 373, 391
(1986) (arguing that mathematical child support formulae are "merely tools ... to
rationalize... hidden views on child support policy").
22. For examples of the literature on child support guidelines, see IRWIN GARFINKEL,
ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT: AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 85-101 (1992); WOMEN'S LEGAL
DEFENSE FUND, ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES
AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 'WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND'S
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (1987)
[hereinafter ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT]; Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 16; Sally F. Goldfarb,
Child Support Guidelines: A Model for Fair Allocation of Child Care, Medical, and Educational
Expenses, 21 FAM. L.Q. 325, 330-49 (1987); Williams, supra note 16.
23. For a noteworthy exception, see Betson, supra note 21.
24. For a useful summary of western philosophical writing on the family, see JEFFREY
BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY 19-98 (1982). See also JACOB .
Ross, THE VIRTUES OF THE FAMILY 124-35 (1994).
25. See infra note 160 and sources cited therein.
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apart,26 critics have only recently begun to challenge it,27 and even the
critics have failed to develop normative standards for measuring
parental obligation."
The lack of an established ethical tradition relating to child support
may help to explain policy makers' failure to articulate a theoretical
basis for current support guidelines, but does not excuse it. In a society
in which law will prescribe the economic relationships of at least half of
the children and their parents," we cannot afford to disregard issues of
justice between family members. The family as a set of affective and
altruistic relationships may lie beyond the realm of justice, but family
law most certainly does not.
In this Article, I aim to develop child support standards that are
grounded in principles of distributive justice and contemporary views of
parental obligation. This is a large task and I do not claim to have
resolved all of the important questions; my intention is to spur more
thinking on this important topic, not to have the last word. My analysis
of child support policy will be both political and interpretive." By
political, I mean that I will assume current child support law and
institutions are alterable, rather than predetermined by culture, history,
or economic organization." By interpretive, I mean that I will analyze
child support policy by examining past and current support law's
26. Parents separated from their children are not only much less likely than custodial parents to
support their minor children, see supra notes 5, 9-10, but also are less likely to share assets and
income with their adult children. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Effect of Divorce on
Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 319 (1995) (finding that, following late
divorces, fathers and mothers had similar rates of asset transfer to their adult children while divorce
during childhood years was associated with a sharp decrease in transfers by fathers and increase in
transfers by custodial mothers; fathers who paid child support were not more likely to make
intergenerational transfers); Nadine F. Marks, Midlife Marital Status Differences in Social Support
Relationships with Adult Children and Psychological Well-Being, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 5 (1995) (finding
that remarried and single parents generally professed less belief in parental financial obligation and
were less likely to give support to their adult children than first marriage parents).
27. See, e.g., SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 9 (1989) (arguing that
contemporary theories of justice "refuse even to discuss the family and its gender structure, much
less to recognize the family as a political institution of primary importance."); Stephen G. Post,
Justice, Redistribution, and the Family, J. Soc. PH.. 91 (Fall-Winter 1990) (describing tendency of
modem distributive justice theories to ignore the family); Peter Vallentyne & Morry Lipson, Equal
Opportunity and the Family, 3 PUB. AFF. Q. 27 (October, 1989) (arguing incompatibility of parental
autonomy and liberal principle of equal oportunity).
28. See ON, supra note 27; Onora O'Neill, Children's Rights and Children's Lives, 98 ETHICS
445 (1988); Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the
Family, 91 ETHICS 6 (1980); Christina H. Sommers, Philosophers Against the Family, in PERSON TO
PERSON 82 (George Graham & Hugh Lafollette eds., 1989).
29. See HERNANDEZ, supra note I, at 69-71.
30. I am indebted to Edward J. MeCaffery for this succinct methodological description. See
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE LJ. 283, 286-87
(1994).
31. For a description of political analysis, see JOHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM I 1-15
(1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
[Vol. 86:41
AUTONOMY OR COMMUNITY?
implicit assumptions about family income entitlements, and comparing
them with contemporary accounts of distributive justice, economic
entitlements based on marriage, and public attitudes toward parental
obligation and fairness; I will not employ a "top-down" approach that
assumes acceptance of one or another basic allocational principle.32
An interpretive approach to child support policy is preferable to a
top-down approach for a variety of reasons. First, there are several basic
principles one might utilize in designing a child support rule, but no
obvious noninterpretive reason to choose one over another.33 Second,
there is widespread agreement among family law scholars that the
expression of contemporary values and beliefs is one of family law's
most important functions.' Third, researchers have found that those
subject to a law evaluate it normatively, and are more likely to obey
those laws that they find fair.3" These various considerations suggest
that a just child support law will conform to our considered judgments
about fairness among family members and the scope of parental
obligation. They also suggest that a child support law failing to
conform to those judgments will not garner public respect and
allegiance.
Part I of the Article describes the historical development of the
child support obligation, its relationship to public assistance law, and its
links with spousal support and family property rules. Part II describes
the child support guidelines that have recently been enacted, the
assumptions upon which they are based, and the results that they
achieve. Part III describes several different contemporary theories of
32. For a description of the interpretive approach, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-
86 (1986); cf. JULES L COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 8-9, 441 (1992) (discussing the top-down
approach). See also McCaffery, supra note 30, at 286 (defining interpretive approach as one "that
looks for norms in society's actual practices and beliefs" and noting important role of interpretive
theories in common law fields such as torts and contracts and in constitutional law). The interpretive
approach is consistent with the ideal of public reason as the means by which a society makes
decisions. For accounts and defenses of the public reason ideal, see RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 31, at 212-54; Joshua Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, in THm IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY 270 (David Copp et al. eds., 1993); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64
U. Cm. L REv. 765 (1997) [hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason].
33. See DwoPKrN, supra note 32, at 408 ("None [of the available philosophical theories] fits
well enough to dominate present law overall; all fit well enough to claim a base within it.").
34. For analyses of the expressive function of family law, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY
LAW AND THE PURsur OF INTIMACY 176-84 (1993); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in
Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L REV. 495 (1992); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of
Family Law, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 991 (1989).
35. See, e.g., ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990) (concluding, based on
extensive empirical research, that "people... evaluate laws and the decisions of legal authorities in
normative terms, obeying the law if it is legitimate and moral and accepting decisions if they are
fairly arrived at."); Tom Tyler & Robyn M. Dawes, Fairness in Groups: Comparing the Self-Interest
and Social Identity Perspectives, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 87, 89-90 (Barbara
A. Mellers & Jonathan Barron eds., 1993) (summarizing research).
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distributive justice and the child support principles that they would
generate, concluding that all theories lead to one of two different
guideline models. The "Community Model" bases the support
obligation on family membership and mandates income sharing as a
basic approach. The "Autonomy Model" bases the support obligation
on both the societal burden produced by nonsupport and the
nonsupporting parent's contractual obligations to the custodial parent;
it mandates public assistance (or poverty) prevention and contract
enforcement as basic goals. Part III also compares current child support
guidelines with both the Community and Autonomy Models,
concluding that they fail under either approach. Part IV describes the
results that the Community and Autonomy Models would achieve and
evaluates available evidence bearing on the choice of a model, including
survey data on public attitudes toward the support obligation, the extent
to which each model is consistent with the assumptions implicit in
related areas of law, and the ability of each model to meet the policy
concerns that motivated the child support initiatives in the first place.
Part IV concludes that the Community Model is the better choice.
I
CHILD SUPPORT IN RETROSPECT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD
SUPPORT OBLIGATION
A legal child support obligation might be derived from any of
three parental duties-to the child, to the other parent, or to the
community. The first child support laws relied exclusively on the
parent's community obligations. But, from time to time, support laws
have relied on each form of parental obligation. Child support has
consistently been linked with contemporary laws governing family
relationships and public assistance entitlements. Economic and cultural
norms have also played an important role in shaping the support
obligation.
A. Parental Obligation to the Community: The Poor Law
Origins of Child Support Law
The first statement of a legal child support obligation within
Anglo-American sources is contained in the Elizabethan Poor Laws."6
The Poor Laws resulted from economic conditions that created a large
class of landless, often destitute laborers. 7 Agrarian parents, who shared
36. See 43 Eliz., ch. 2, §§ I, III and V (1601) (Eng.).
37. For detailed descriptions of the economic and social dislocations that gave rise to the Poor
Laws, see, JOYCE 0. APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND 129-57 (1978); W.K. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND, 1480-1660: A STUDY OF
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the work of economic production with their children in a fixed location,
could be counted on to share their resources. But the parents of this
new laborer class, who were often forced to seek work at a distance and
derived no economic benefit from their children, could not be counted
on to provide support.
The Poor Laws transformed moral duties-of family members
toward each other and of the community toward its members-into
legal obligations." They instituted a comprehensive public welfare
program, funded through taxation, that provided assistance to needy
members of the community whenever family support was unavailable.39
They also established a legal support obligation that required parents
and other specified relatives to reimburse the community for public
aid.4 The Laws restricted direct monetary assistance to those incapable
of self-help; rather than receiving support in their parents' home,
children thus were indentured as apprentices.4'
B. Obligations within the Family: From Moral
Duty to Equitable Remedy
In contrast to the Poor Laws' clear statement of community
entitlement to enforce parental responsibility, the Common Law
accorded the child no legally enforceable support right. Like his
contemporaries, Blackstone held that the "insuperable degree of
affection" between parent and child was a sufficient guarantor of
parental support to obviate the need for legal sanctions.42 In keeping
THE CHANGING PATrERN OF ENGLISH SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS 58-86 (1959); SIDNEY WEBB &
BEATRICE VEBB, ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY, PART I: THE OLD POOR LAW (1927).
38. See BRIAN TIERNEY, MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY AND ITS
APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 44-109 (1959) (describing charitable obligations of individuals and
religious institutions under medieval ecclesistical law).
39. The program drew together previous ad hoc attempts to cope with the social and economic
problems created by this new laborer class. See JORDAN, supra note 37; WEBB & VEBB, supra note
37; Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origins, Development, and Present
Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257-87 (1964).
40. Children were eligible for public aid when abandoned, orphaned, or when their parents
were not "able to keep and maintain [them]." 43 Eliz. ch. 2, § 1 (1601) (Eng.). The manner and rate
of parental reimbursement were determined by county Justices of the Peace; default resulted in a
standard penalty of twenty shillings per month. See id. at ch. 2, §§ V, VI, VII. See also tenBroek,
supra note 39, at 282-85.
41. See 43 Eliz., ch. 2, §§ I, V (1601) (Eng.); Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and
Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. LJ. 887, 895-96
(1975); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L REV. 423, 434-35 (1983);
tenBroek, supra note 39, at 278-82. Contemporary writers typically urged apprenticeship at the age
of five or six. See, e.g., APPLEBY, supra note 37, at 141 (quoting various seventeenth century
pamphlets).
42. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *447 ("By
begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in
them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved."). One group of
commentators has argued that the Common Law courts' reluctance to create a legally enforceable
1998]
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with this view, eighteenth-century English and American courts
provided children with no assistance in obtaining parental support
beyond the Poor Laws.43
The Common Law's failure to accord the child an enforceable
support right derived, in part, from a general reluctance to pierce the
legal unity of the family. During this era, virtually all income and
property rights were vested in the male household head; wives had no
more entitlement to support than their children.' Wives and children
also had extremely limited inheritance rights.4 Indeed, their legal
identities were so merged with the family patriarch's that individually
they could not maintain a lawsuit, even against a person outside the
family.4
6
With the new conditions of the industrial age came a shift away
from this perspective on the family. A hundred years after Blackstone,
American family law recognized a paternal support obligation that was
enforceable on behalf of the child, rather than the public, and which
applied whether or not the child was in danger of becoming a public
charge.47 Like the Common Law approach that it succeeded, this new
support obligation was grounded in a particular conception of the
family and a larger (although new) network of legal principles.
Statutory divorce laws, the Married Women's Property Acts, and the
support obligation arose, in part, from the fear that such an enforceable duty would lead to a loss of
parental control over children. See Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connections Between
Parents' Duty to Support and Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 689, 692-95 (1990).
43. See, e.g., JOHN EEKELAAR & MAVIS MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE 1-3, 19-
31 (1986); tenBroek, supra note 39, at 287-300. As late as 1840, English courts held that "[i]n point
of law, a father who gives no authority, and enters into no contract, is no more liable for goods
supplied to his son, than a brother, or an uncle, or a mere stranger would be." Mortimore v. Wright,
151 Eng. Rep. 502, 504 (Ex. 1840). Courts sometimes did indirectly provide for the support of
children in cases of parental separation through remedies (alimony and necessaries actions) available
to a custodial mother. See, e.g., EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra, at 19-22.
44. At marriage, the husband gained control of any property the wife had owned previously;
thereafter the wife could not buy or sell land, enter into contracts, or even make a will. See HOME3R
H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 498-501 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter CLARK, SECOND EDITION]. See also MARY A. MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY To
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). The
husband was also entitled to his wife's and childrens' wages. See id. at 14; ELIZABETH B.
WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-61 7-8 (1987).
45. The wife's sole inheritance claim was dower, which entitled her to a life estate in one-third
of her husband's lands. See CLARK, SECOND EDITION, supra note 44, at 500-01; WARBASSE, supra
note 44, at 10-11. Although the Common Law recognized a father's right to his child's labor, it
accorded children no inheritance rights except in the case of entailed property. See tenBroek, supra
note 39, at 287-90.
46. See CLARK, FRT EDITION, supra note 12, at 220 (wife unable to sue without joining
husband); id. at 233 (minor had to sue through guardian or "next friend").
47. For a description and analysis of the development of American child support law during the
nineteenth century, see, for example, tenBroek, supra note 39, at 299-317. English law did not
recognize a child support obligation independent of that owed to the custodial parent until the 1920s.
See, e.g., EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra note 43, at 19-20.
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alimony claim also developed during this period,48 and evidenced the
same shift away from the earlier view of the family as a unified legal
entity. These new laws transformed the family just as the Poor Laws had
transformed the community, with the result that familial obligations
based on the claims of affection and morality gave way to legal duties
and sanctions.
The new child support obligation reflected some, but not all, of the
Poor Law concepts that preceded it. Like the public relief applicant, the
child who sought support was required to show dependence and
worthiness; children who were emancipated from parental control or
who refused to obey reasonable parental commands were no more
entitled to parental support than the able-bodied were entitled to public
funds.49 In contrast to the Poor Law approach, however, the new child
support laws did not limit the child's claim to subsistence. Instead,
courts held that the child was entitled to support that reflected, insofar as
the father's current means permitted, the family's income and prior
standard of living.0 The value of the support obligation was thus left to
the discretion of the presiding judge; even when initially fixed, the
award was subject to modification based on changes in the child's or
father's circumstances 2
The developing law of spousal support, or alimony, exhibited
similar features.53 The wife's support claim, like the child's, was based
on the marital standard of living, subject to judicial discretion, and
modifiable based on changed circumstances.' It was also predicated on
worthiness and dependence, failing if the wife was at fault in causing the
dissolution of the marriage and terminating upon her remarriage.
48. For historical accounts of these developments, see CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980); MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
(1985); WARBASSE, supra note 44; Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850,
71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983).
49. See, e.g., 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child, § 67 at 375 (1978) (citing cases and concluding that
the "child who voluntarily abandons the parent's home for the purpose of seeking his or her fortune
in the world or to avoid parental discipline and restraint forfeits the claim to support").
50. See, e.g, CLARK, FRsT EDITION, supra note 12, at 496.
51. See id. ("The amount to be awarded for the support of a child... lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court.").
52. See id. at 498-507 (describing traditional modification grounds and procedures).
53. The alimony remedy was originally developed by English ecclesiastical courts to provide
recompense to the wife whose husband had both profited from property that she had brought into the
marriage and caused its dissolution. For historical accounts of the development of alimony law during
the nineteenth century, see CLARK, FIRST EDITION, supra note 12, at 420-22 (describing the
development of alimony law in the United States); EEKELAAR & MACLEAN, supra note 43, at 3-15
(tracing the history of support law in England).




The new child support and alimony laws thus effected only a
partial transformation of moral duty into legal entitlement. Rather than
fixed, unvarying legal obligations, the new laws created equitable
remedies, variable over time, and available only to applicants who were
both dependent and blameless. Legislative insistence on dependence
and virtue as the preconditions for obtaining the new support remedies
derived from a variety of sources. One was the traditional Poor Law
concept that monetary aid was the sole privilege of the "worthy" poor
who could not help themselves;55 by imposing obligations directly
between family members, the new familial support laws averted some
claims on the public purse and ensured a consistent network of public
and private obligation.56 Another factor was the common status of
women and children as economic dependents of the family's male
breadwinner. Yet another was the emerging nineteenth century
tendency to idealize both women and children as innocents who
required protection from worldly concerns." And the joint economic
interests of children and their custodial mother, whose needs and
expenditures were inextricably linked, may also have contributed to
structural similarity in the rules, as well as to the blurry demarcation
between what theoretically were two quite separate entitlements.
The joint economic interests of child and custodial parent also
point to another function served by the new child support and alimony
laws-that of ensuring fairness between parents. Just as family
dissolution created the potential for parents to burden the community
with their children's care, it created the potential for one parent to shift
all, or a disproportionate share, of that burden to the other. The new
child support and alimony laws thus served to allocate the child's
expenses between parents as well as to ensure the performance of
obligations to the child and community.
The shared economic interests of women and children also
produced tension between the laws of alimony and child support.
Whenever the custodial mother was blameworthy or remarried, this
55. For analyses of nineteenth century views on the link between poverty and morality, see
GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE
(1984); Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare
State, 72 YALE LI. 286 (1962).
56. See, e.g., tenBroek, supra note 39, at 291-306 (describing the new familial support laws and
their links with contemporary poverty law).
57. On nineteenth century ideals for women, see NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977); DEBORAH GORHAM,
THE VICTORIAN GIRL AND THE FEMININE IDEAL (1982); Ruth H. Bloch, American Feminine Ideals
in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785-1815, 4 FEMINIST STUD. 101 (1978); Barbara
Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966). For children, see JOHN
DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 99-107 (1986); JOSEPH F. KETT, RrTS OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 To
THE PRESENT (1977).
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conflict was apparent: in awarding support to a deserving child, no
court could prevent its joint utilization by the child's undeserving
mother.
Nineteenth century courts seldom explicitly recognized either the
apportionment function of child support law or the inherent tension
between alimony and child support principles." We have little evidence
of how courts resolved these issues, let alone evidence on typical child
support/alimony outcomes. Although late nineteenth century Census
Bureau data suggest that alimony was awarded infrequently,59 there is a
paucity of data on the frequency with which child support was awarded,
the level of payments, or the factors that judges deemed important in
fashioning an award. The results produced by the new child support
laws are largely a mystery right up to the modem era.
C. The Modem Era: The Guidelines Movement and Growing
Disparity in the Status of Spouses and Children
In the late 1970s, the federal government began, for the first time,
to collect national data on child support awards and payments. The
impetus for both this data collection effort and the new wave of child
support laws that accompanied it was concern over rising rates of single
parenting' ° and welfare dependence 6 -the same concern that motivated
earlier support laws.62 It is thus unsurprising that reforms were initiated
58. See CLARK, FIRST EDITION, supra note 12, at 490 ("Notwithstanding a few contrary
cases .... it is usually and properly held that the husband may be ordered to pay child support in the
future regardless of the fact that the wife is found guilty of conduct justifying the granting of a
divorce to the husband. On this point a sharp distinction has to be made between alimony, as to which
fault is relevant, and child support, as to which fault is irrelevant.").
59. See PAUL H. JACOBSON & PAULINE F. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
127 (1959) (reporting, based on census data, that between 1887 and 1906, 9.3% of U.S. divorces
included provisions for permanent alimony).
60. Between 1960 and 1980, the percentage of American children living in a single-parent
household climbed from 8.7% to 18.3%. See HERNANDEZ, supra note 1, at 65 tbl.3.1. Most single
parents are women. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 66 tbl.79 (1995) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (reporting
that in 1994, 23% of children lived in a mother-only household, 3% in a father-only household). The
trend toward single motherhood shows no sign of abating. See Roger A. Wojtkiewicz et al., The
Growth of Families Headed by Women: 1950-80, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 19 (1990) (describing and
analyzing sources of trend toward single motherhood).
61. Concurrently, the proportion of U.S. children who were AFDC recipients rose from 2.5% in
1948 to 11.3% in 1973 and program costs rose from $1.1 billion in 1960 to $9.9 billion in 1976. See
Lowell H. Lima & Robert C. Harris, The Child Support Enforcement Program in the United States, in
CHILD SUPPORT: FROM DEBT COLLECTION TO SOCIAL POLICY 20, 22 (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B.
Kamerman eds., 1988). The proportion of children with a deceased parent receiving AFDC
decreased from 42% in 1940 to 2.2% in 1979. See id. at 21.
62. See, e.g., Sanford N. Katz, A Historical Perspective on Child-Support Laws in the United
States, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 17, 19-20 (Judith Cassetty ed., 1983)
(describing reasons for reforms); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 166, 169 (Herma H. Kay & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1990) ("When
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by the federal government, which today foots most of the bill for
welfare payments to children, instead of the states, which traditionally
have made child support law.63
While sixteenth century lawmakers focused on public support
institutions and their nineteenth century counterparts on private support
obligations, contemporary policymakers have taken a hybrid approach.
Some of the new federal requirements were aimed exclusively at the
welfare-eligible population. Others, like the support guidelines
requirement, were directed at the entire support-eligible population.'
Like earlier support innovations, the new rules reflect and reinforce
public assistance principles. Thus, just as contemporary welfare law has
abandoned individualized assessment of need in favor of standardized
eligibility criteria and grants,' Congress required numerical guidelines
to replace discretionary decisionmaking."
Of course, the new initiatives also reflect contemporary cultural and
economic norms, norms that have shifted dramatically since the
nineteenth century. By the time the new support requirements were
adopted, women were no longer considered innocents, like children, in
need of protection. More importantly, the majority of married women
engaged in paid employment, so that wives and children no longer
shared a common status as dependents of the family's male
breadwinner.67 The widespread entry of women into the labor force also
substantially lessened the possibility that former wives would wind up on
the public dole.
Reflecting these shifts, the new federal requirements applied
exclusively to child support, eroding the prior consistency between child
and spousal support principles. Although contemporary alimony law
Congress enacted the sweeping legislation to strengthen enforcement of child support obligations
across the nation, the primary goal was to reduce the federal cost of the AFDC program.").
63. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-03 (1994).
64. The Federal Enforcement Initiative of 1974 established the federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement and required each state to establish mechanisms for assisting parents in establishing
paternity, obtaining child support awards, and enforcing child support obligations. These initiatives
were mandated for AFDC recipients, but made available to others. The Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984 and the Family Support Act of 1988 mandated additional enforcement
mechanisms in AFDC cases, including tax refund interception, routine wage withholding, and
periodic award updating. For more detailed descriptions of the requirements of the 1974, 1984, and
1988 child support laws, see Lima & Harris, supra note 61, at 26-41.
65. For descriptions and criticisms of this trend within public assistance law, see KRISTEN
GR4NBJERG ET AL., POVERTY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 133-62 (1978); William H. Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE LJ. 1198 (1983).
66. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485 § 103, 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988)) (guidelines must establish a rebuttable presumption of the appropriate
level of support).
67. In 1994, 60.7% of U.S. married women were in the paid labor force. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 60, at 405 tbl.636.
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has moved toward standards based on need instead of fault,6 it is still
highly discretionary.69 In contrast to the Congressional emphasis on
increasing child support levels, the major alimony innovation during
this period was the durational award, designed to limit alimony
payments to a fixed period of economic "rehabilitation. '70
The joint economic interests of children and their mothers have not
substantially abated, however. Although the percentage of fathers
awarded custody has increased substantially, the number of children
who live in a father-only household is still small.71 As a result of these
conflicting trends, the tension between alimony and child support
principles has intensified.
Tension has also developed between the rules governing wives' and
children's familial property rights. While the traditional Common Law
model still applies to children-they have no claim to their parents'
assets whatsoever-marriage is increasingly treated as a relationship that
mandates sharing. "Right of election" laws, for example, now grant a
surviving spouse an entitlement to a fixed share of the decedent
spouse's probate assets;72 in many states, the right of election attaches to
a wide range of non-probate property as well. 73
Even more important is the recent infiltration of community
property principles into divorce and inheritance law. The community
property concept, a product of the Civil Law tradition that arose on the
European continent, treats marital income and assets purchased with that
income as the joint property of husband and wife, without regard to
68. See Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27 FAM. LQ. 515,
521 & 534 tbl.1 (1994) (reporting that in 1993,27 states excluded marital fault from consideration in
determining alimony).
69. See, e.g., THOMAS J. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
PROPERTY §§ 13-9 to 13-24.1 (1994) (comparing state alimony rules); State Divorce Laws
(Reference File) Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 400.001 to 453.001 (1989) (describing alimony rules state-by-
state).
70. For descriptions and criticisms of contemporary alimony law, see Ann L. Estin,
Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L REV. 721 (1993); Sally F.
Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351 (1988-89);
Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM.
LQ. 573 (1988); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing
with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L REV. 67 (1993).
71. 3% of U.S. children lived in a father-only household in 1994, as compared to 1% in 1970.
23% lived in a mother-only household in 1994, as compared to 11% in 1970. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 60, at 66 tbl.79.
72. All of the Common Law states except Georgia statutorily grant the surviving spouse an
entitlement to a share of the decedent spouse's property. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY
M. JOHANSON, WVILLS, TRusTs, AND ESTATES 483-84 (5th ed. 1995); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET
AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 473 (1991).
73. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 72, at 510-12; WAGGONER ET AL., supra
note 72, at 479.
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title.74 While the community property model still applies fully in only
nine states,75 the model's concept of marriage as a relationship of
sharing and equality has made remarkable gains in recent years.76 The
taxation of marital income and property, as well as spousal interests in
Social Security benefits and ERISA pensions, are now governed by
sharing principles.' The new Uniform Probate Code elective share rules
explicitly attempt to replicate community property principles.7" And,
although title still determines asset management and control during
marriage in most states, it no longer determines asset disposition at
divorce; all states that formerly awarded property to the title-holder have
adopted some form of "equitable" property distribution rule79 that
permits distribution to the nontitled spouse and typically produces, at
least in judicially determined cases, a relatively equal division of assets."'
Although the Civil Law model grants children as well as spouses an
inheritance entitlement," this type of familial sharing has not yet found
74. For an overview of community property law, see ROBERT L MENNELL & THOMAS M
BOYKOFF, COMMaUNrrY PROPERTY (1988). The reasons for the divergence in English and
continental European marital property laws remain obscure. See, e.g., Mary M. Wenig, The Marital
Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and Future, 1990 Wis. L REV. 807, 811-16 (1990).
75. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington have
adopted community property principles. Wisconsin became a community property state in 1986 by
adopting the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA). See MENNELL & BOYKOFF, supra note 74, at
13-17; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-766.979 (West 1996).
76. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 72, at 473 ("[C]ommunity property ideas
have made noticeable inroads into the separate property system within the last 50 years"); Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L REV. 21, 41-61 (1994) (describing
trends in divorce and elective share law that reflect community property concepts).
77. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 72, at 476-78, 489-91, 1057.
78. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 2, general cmt. (1990) (indicating that reforms were
designed "to bring elective-share law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an
economic partnership... applied in both the common-law and community-property states when a
marriage ends in divorce"). See also John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the
Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST. J. 303, 304-14 (1987) (discussing history
and rationale of forced share statute).
79. See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 69, at § 13-8.1 n.9 (categorizing state property distribution
rules). For descriptions of the historical development of the equitable property distribution concept
and the sources of its recent acceptance, see Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The
Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOKLYN L REV. 621,
627-32 (1991); Mary Ann Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal
Unions, in THE CAMBRIDGE LECrURES 245,245-50 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds., 1981).
80. See Garrison, supra note 10, at 452-54, 500 (reporting, based on analysis of 323 New York
equitable distribution decisions, that net worth was divided relatively equally in 48% of cases pre-
appeal and 58% post-appeal); Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FoRDHAm L REV. 827, 854-55 (1988) (reporting,
based on evaluation of judicial opinions from six equitable distribution states, that judges rarely
deviated from equal property division except in extraordinary cases, which typically involved spousal
disability).
81. See, e.g., Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas and
Louisiana, 4 LA. L REv. 42 (1941); Michael P. Porter, Comment, Forced Heirs, the Legitime and Loss
of the Legitime in Lousisiana, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710 (1963).
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a receptive climate in the United States." Indeed, the one state where
there has been legislative activity on children's inheritance rights
(Louisiana) is the only state that currently grants children an inheritance
entitlement; the entitlement has been under legislative attack for several
years. 3
As a result of these various trends, laws governing economic
relations within the family no longer evidence common assumptions
and consistent goals. Child support is subject to increasing state
regulation aimed at raising support levels, while spousal support is
increasingly viewed as a limited, need-based remedy. Spouses are now
seen as members of a sharing community who should divide the fruits
of their relationship equally, while parents are still treated as
autonomous individuals with far more limited obligations.
Today's child support law remains intimately linked with public
assistance law. It remains linked-but increasingly at odds-with
contemporary rules governing spousal support and spousal property
rights. The conflicting visions of family loyalty and obligation that
underlie these related areas of law raise fundamental questions about the
nature and scope of the child support obligation.
II
THE NEW CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES:
THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTS
A. Current Child Support Guidelines: The Basic Model
When Congress mandated the development of numerical support
guidelines in the mid 1980s, it did not specify a particular formula or
model. As a result, each state was left to make its own decisions on the
normative values that would guide the development of child support
policy, how those values would be ordered, and how they would be
implemented. Put more concretely, states had to resolve-explicitly or
implicitly-these questions: To whom does the income of individual
family members belong? Exactly what do parents owe their children
82. Louisiana is currently the only state to grant children an inheritance entitlement. See
DUKEMNTER & JOHANSON, supra note 72, at 550. Recent scholarly commentary is critical of the
Common Law approach. See, e.g., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of
Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change into a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS LJ.
1197 (1990); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L REv. 83
(1994).
83. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 72, at 550. The Lousiana Supreme Court held
that 1989 and 1990 legislation limiting the forced share to children under 23 and handicapped adult
children was unconstitutional in Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1172 (La. 1993). A
constitutional amendment removing protection for forced heirship has since been introduced in the




and each other? What do they owe the public, that may be forced to
pick up the tab for children's needs that parents have failed to meet?
Because none of these questions have uncontroversial answers, one
would expect spirited debate and a range of legislative outcomes. In the
early days of the guidelines movement, scholars also offered legislators
a variety of policy options. Some advocated an "equal outcomes"
model aimed at achieving equal living standards for the child and
noncustodial parent."M Others advocated a "continuity-of-expenditure"
approach, which based the support obligation on typical child-related
expenditure within intact, two-parent families. 5 And others urged that
the new guidelines seek, above all else, to ensure that the supported child
did not become impoverished as a result of parental separation. 6 While
these approaches garnered the most attention, legislators could also have
opted for a utilitarian model or one that aimed at ensuring the child a
minimally adequate incomeY
But while the range of policy options was extensive, policy debate
was muted and rarely focused either on the underlying choice between
individualist and sharing norms within the family or on the ordering of
community and familial obligation. Proponents of the equal outcomes
model, for example, argued that the "model focuses upon the child's
continuing right to share in the post-divorce economic fortunes of
her/his parents in a manner which is consistent with the protections
afforded the child in an intact family ... ,"I' but failed to note that an
84. See Judith Cassetty et al., The EIS (Equal Living Standards) Model for Child Support
Awards, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 329; Philip Eden et al., In the Best
Interests of Children: A Simplified Modelfor Equalizing the Living Standards of Parental Households,
in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 353; Isabel V. Sawhill, Developing Normative
Standards for Child-Support Payments, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION: RESEARCH,
PRACTICE, AND SOCIAL POLICY 79 (Judith Cassetty ed., 1983).
85. See ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS:
ADVISORY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL REPORT H (Report to U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Sept. 1987); Garfinkel & Melli, supra note
16, at 177-78.
86. See The Family Court of the State of Delaware, Procedure in Deciding Child Support
Cases, reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE 1-169
(1986). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL
AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 91-93 (1993) (urging adoption of poverty-focused (Melson type) child
support guideline).
87. See, e.g., Betson, supra note 21, at 9-10 (describing utilitarian support formula); Sawhill,
supra note 84, at 99-102 (describing two different minimum income formulae).
88. Judith Cassetty et al., The ELS (Equal Living Standards) Model for Child Support Awards, in
ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 329, 332 (emphasis deleted). By contrast,
proposals for equalizing spousal living standards post-divorce have been supported with a variety of
policy arguments and claims grounded in one or another theory of distributive justice. See, e.g.,
ObUN, supra note 27, at 183 (using contractarian methodology to argue in favor of equalizing post-
divorce spousal living standards); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to
Equality, 58 FORDHAM L REV. 539, 578 (1990) (advocating equalization of post-divorce spousal
living standards "to achieve equality between spouses who have divided their labors during marriage.
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equal outcomes approach conflicts with both the rules governing
traditional child support and inheritance law-or that it does comport
with the sharing approach increasingly applied to marriage. The
principal author of the continuity-of-expenditure approach, on the
other hand, offered eight "soup-to-nuts" principles to guide the
development of guidelines, but offered no evidence that those principles
support continuity-of-expenditure.89 And much of the child support
literature of this period ignored the basic policy questions altogether,
focusing instead on narrow issues of implementation.
One reason for the constricted debate was the speed with which the
guidelines movement came to fruition. Prior to 1984, when Congress
first required states to adopt advisory support guidelines, only a handful
of states and localities utilized guidelines of any description;' within a
few months of the October 1989 deadline imposed by Congress, all
states had adopted guidelines meeting the federal requirement.91 The
federal government also contributed to the lack of debate on principles
by commissioning an economic analysis of child-rearing costs, relevant
only to the continuity-of-expenditure model.' In the end, no state
adopted an equal-outcomes, utilitarian, or minimum-income approach.
Only three adopted guidelines that took poverty prevention as their
basic aim.93 All others adopted guidelines utilizing the continuity-of-
expenditure approach."
If spouses have not divided the labor, either because they were not married long enough or because
they did not have children, then income sharing should not apply"); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform
and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L REv. 1103, 1114 (1989) (relying on investment partnership theory of
marriage as basis for post-divorce income equalization based on marital duration). For an intriguing
hybrid approach, see June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community,
31 Hous. L. REv. 359, 392 (1994) (explaining that "[t]he economic community defined by parental
obligations toward their children overlays the community defined by the relationship between the
parents. Taken together, these overlapping sources of economic interdependence may result in a
community that lasts longer than the marriage itself').
89. See WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 6-8.
90. Delaware had instituted a nonstatutory presumptive statewide guideline as early as 1979;
Washington and Wisconsin issued statewide advisory guidelines in the early 1980s; California,
Illinois, and Minnesota enacted statutory presumptive guidelines in the year preceding the 1984 Child
Support Amendments. See Williams, supra note 16, at 1.
91. See id.
92. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Looking for Policy Choices Within an Economic Methodology: A
Critique of the Income Shares Model, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 27, 28
(noting that the economic analysis commissioned by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) "create[s] the appearance of scientific, objective 'truth' and is "given heightened validity
by virtue of OCSE's involvement").
93. Delaware, Hawaii, and West Virginia adopted guidelines of this type. See MUNSTERMAN,
supra note 14, at 12.
94. See Polikoff, supra note 92, at 11-12.
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The continuity-of-expenditure model was expressed in two
different guideline formulae.9 Under the "percentage-of-obligor-
income" formula,9 6 the child support obligation is stated as a percentage
that varies with the number of children to be supported.97  The
percentages are based on a variety of consumer surveys and purport to
represent typical expenditure patterns in intact families.98  The
applicable percentage is applied to the noncustodial parent's income to
produce a child support value.99
The "income-shares" formula similarly utilizes standard
percentagesire that are applied to parental income and vary depending
on the number of children.10' But an income shares formula typically
requires more information and arithmetic. The percentages are
calculated to exclude child-care costs and any costs associated with
extraordinary medical care on the theory that these, potentially very
95. As of 1994, one or another of these models was in use in 45 states. See Williams, supra
note 16, at 6-7 (reporting current guideline model on a state-by-state basis). Not all state guidelines
are "pure" examples of the income shares or percentage-of-income models. The New York
guideline, for example, utilizes standardized percentages that do not vary by income level, but
requires individualized calculations of child care and extraordinary medical expenses. See N.Y.
DoM. REL. L. §§ 236B.1-b(c)(4)-(5) (McKinney Supp. 1994). It also requires a calculation that
includes the custodial parent's income, but, unless combined parental income exceeds the statutory
income cap, the custodial parent's income has no effect on the child support award. See id. at §
(c)(2). See also Williams, supra note 16, at 6 (categorizing New York guideline as percentage-of-
obligor income type because inclusion of custodial parent income has no mathematical effect on
support value).
96. For accounts of this model and its development, see GARFINKEL, supra note 22, at 88-101;
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 16, at 164-65.
97. The percentages are 17% of noncustodial parent income for one child, 25% for two, 29%
for three, 31% for four, and 34% for five or more. See Williams, supra note 16, at 5.
98. The percentages utilized in the percentage-of-obligor income formula were based on a
review of the then existing research conducted by economist Jacques van der Gang. See Jacques
van der Gang, On Measuring the Cost of Children, 4 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 77 (1982).
But, according to one of the authors of the formula, given the "enormous" range of estimates, this
economic data provided "only a starting point for determining the percentages .... " GARFINKEL,
supra note 22, at 89.
99. In many versions of this model, the percentages do not apply to income above a certain
income "cap." For state-by-state comparisons, see DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 14, and
MUNSTERMAN, supra note 14.
100. Unlike the percentage-of-obligor-income formula, the income shares percentages were
based on the one study believed to be most reliable. See THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, INVESTrING IN
CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL EXPENDITURES (1984). For a description of how the
Espenshade study was used to derive the percentages, see WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 67-80, 129-
40. Some income shares guidelines have since been updated to take account of more recent data
developed by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement based on a requirement in the Family
Support Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-485 § 128). See DAVID M. BETSON, UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF
CHILDREN FROM THE 1980-86 CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY (1990).
101. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 85, pt. II, at 65-80 (describing development of this model);
Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support, 21 FAM. L.Q. 281, 291-95 (1987)
[hereinafter Williams, Guidelines] (same).
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large, expenses are too variable to permit standardization. 12  The
percentages are also variable and, in most versions, regressive, with lower
percentages applicable to higher incomes. 3 The support calculation
takes into account the incomes of both parents, with the final award
obtained by prorating the percentage-based support obligation plus
child-care costs according to the percentage of family income
contributed by each. 4  Awards calculated under income shares
guidelines thus represent a compromise between standardization and
individualized case processing.
In sum, continuity-of-expenditure guidelines, although motivated
by a common aim, vary substantially in their methodology, complexity,
and results. The same facts, about the same family, may yield an
altogether different child support award. 05
In contrast to the diversity of continuity-of-expenditure formulae,
the poverty prevention approach is reflected in only one guideline
formula, the so-called "Melson" model. This formula, pioneered in
Delaware by Judge Elwood F. Melson, Jr. for use in his own courtroom,
was the first guideline to be adopted statewide. In revised form, it is still
in effect in Delaware and has been adopted in three other states. 6 The
formula establishes "primary support" values designed to meet the
minimum needs of one adult and one or more children."W The adult
primary support value is first subtracted from each parent's income; the
remainder is then applied, in proportion to the parents' relative incomes,
to the basic child support obligation.' The Melson formula does not
take poverty prevention as its only goal, however. If the child support
obligor still has available income, a fixed percentage of that income,
based on those utilized by the percentage-of-obligor-income model, is
102. See WLLIAMS, supra note 85, at 77; Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 332-34.
103. See, e.g., Williams, Guidelines, supra note 101, at 292-93 tbls. 2 & 3. In some states the
percentages also vary depending on the ages of the children. See David Amaudo, Deviation from
State Child Support Guidelines, in NExT GENERATION, supra note 16, at 85, 87 tbl.1.
104. See Williams, Guidelines, supra note 101, at 293.
105. For examples and analyses, see DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 14, at 34 tbl.4-F;
Maureen A. Pirog-Good, Child Support Guidelines and the Economic Well-Being of Children in the
United States, 42 FAM. REL. 453, 455-57 tbl.1 (1993). See also Williams, Guidelines, supra note 101,
at 306, 308, figs.3 & 4 (graphically showing child support percentages by obligor income under
different guideline types).
106. As of 1994, Hawaii, Montana, and West Virginia utilized a guideline based on the Melson
formula. See Williams, supra note 16, at 7.
107. As of 1994, the primary support values were $220 per month for the first child, $165 per
month for each of the second and third children, and $110 per month for each additional child. See
id. at 6.
108. The basic support obligation equals the sum of the children's primary support needs plus




then added to the basic support obligation.Iro The Melson formula thus
seeks to avert impoverishment of the noncustodial parent and the child,
in that order. A secondary goal is income sharing in relation to
expenditure patterns within the intact family.
Although a poverty-prevention guideline could easily vary from
the Melson formula-for example, by giving equal or greater priority to
the needs of the child as compared to those of the noncustodial parent,
or by taking poverty-prevention as a sole aim-no American
jurisdiction has adopted any other type of poverty-prevention formula.
All of the states have thus far adopted either the Melson formula or a
variant of the continuity-of-expenditure model. Thus despite the fact
that the guidelines legislation evidenced no central philosophy and
required no particular approach, all state guidelines today aim, to some
extent, at maintaining continuity of child-related expenditure; in a
handful, poverty-prevention is also an articulated goal.
B. What the Guidelines Have Accomplished
Although research reports analyzing the impact of the new
guidelines are still few in number, available reports suggest that child
support awards remain highly variable' and that the average value of
awards has increased modestly but not dramatically."' Despite
109. In 1994, the percentages used in Delaware were "18 percent for one child, 27 percent for
two children, 35 percent for three children, 40 percent for four children, 45 percent for five children,
and 50 percent for six or more children." Robert G. Williams, Implementation of the Child Support
Provisions of the Family Support Act: Child Support Guidelines, Updating of Awards and Routine
Income Withholding, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 93, 98 (Irwin Garfinkel et al.
eds., 1994).
110. See MARILYN L. RAY, NEW YORK STATE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT EVALUATION
PROJECT REPORT 54 (1994) (22% of sample child support orders followed guidelines); Marygold S.
Melli & Judi Bartfeld, The Wisconsin Percentage of Income Standard: How is it Being Used?, 11 Wis.
J. FAM. L. 60, 61 tbl.1 (1991) (51% of sample child support orders followed guidelines; no
determination possible in 25% of cases); Kathryn D. Rettig et al., Impact of Child Support Guidelines
on the Economic Well-Being of Children, 40 FAM. REL. 167, 170 (1991) (12.6% of sample court-
ordered child support awards followed Minnesota guidelines); Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of
Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25
FAM. LQ. 325, 339-40 (1991) (reduction in award variability occurred following introduction of
guidelines in two of three states for low-income families, one of three for upper-income families, and
in no state for middle-income families). For a descriptive summary of state data on award variability
under current guidelines, see David Arnaudo, Deviation from State Child Support Guidelines, in NEXT
GENERATION, supra note 16, at 88-94.
111. The largest and most detailed study to date is described in Thoennes, supra note 110, at 332-
33,336 (reporting that average post-guidelines award was 15% higher than pre-guideline average
across three-state sample). In only one of the three research states-that state with the lowest pre-
guideline award levels-did all income groups experience significant increases in the level of child
support attributable to the introduction of mandatory guidelines; in one state no income group did. See
id. See also COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THE IMPACT OF CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES ON THE LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS IN VIRGINIA 11 (1990)
(reporting that mean court child support award was 17% higher when advisory guideline amount was
used); VERMONT AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES, IN SUPPORT OF OUR CHILDREN: A SURVEY OF
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predictions by some experts that guidelines would triple child support
values," 2 increases to date have fallen far short of that level. In some
states, average award levels apparently did not increase at all after
guidelines were introduced."' In others, increases were registered by
some income groups but not others." 4  Moreover, a significant
proportion of the increase in average child support values that
researchers have noted may simply be due to the imposition of token,
rather than zero-dollar, awards in cases of unemployed or female
noncustodial parents."5 While these results do not suggest that children
are worse off under current guidelines than they were under
discretionary child support laws, they do suggest that the new rules have
not dramatically improved the lot of children eligible for child
support."6
CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS AND DIVORCED PARENTS IN VERMONT (1989) (estimating that guidelines
increased child support awards in divorce cases by an average of 23.6%; percentage of obligor
income awarded in child support not reported); Kathryn Stafford et al., The Effects of Child Support
Guidelines: An Analysis of the Evidence in Court Records, 11 LIFESrYLES: FAmt. & ECON. IsUES 361,
376 (1990) (reporting that after adoption of guidelines weekly mean child support amount, in constant
dollars, increased by 21% in three Ohio counties; percentage of obligor income awarded in child
support not reported).
The only study to report a dramatic post-guidelines increase in child support values appears to be
in error. See Ginny Fay & Emily Read, CHILD SUPPORT IN ALASKA: AN EVALUATION OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF ALASKA'S CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 38, 63 thl.19 (1991)
(reporting that the average support award increased by nearly 100% after the introduction of
guidelines). Fay and Read rely on a comparison of post-guidelines awards with pre-guidelines award
averages reported in BARBARA BAKER, FAMILY EQUITY AT ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1987). However, they appear to have
misread Baker, who reports only a mean monthly child support award per child. See id. at ii, 13-14.
She does not report a mean total child support award except for one-child families. That one-child
mean, updated from 1985 dollars to constant 1989 dollars, is 16% less than the post-guidelines one-
child mean reported by Fay & Read.
112. See RON HASKINS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ESTIMATES OF
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS POTENTIAL AND THE INCOME SECURITY OF FEMALE-
HEADED FAMILIES V, 29 (1985) (making "moderate" estimate that application of either of two
guideline models would increase child support collection potential by 350%). For a more
conservative estimate, see Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support Guidelines: Will They Make a
Difference?, 12 J. FAM. ISSUES 404, 426 (1991) (predicting that introduction of guidelines would
increase child support award levels between 77% and 88%, depending on the guideline adopted).
113. Thoennes, supra note 110, at 336 (reporting that, in Illinois, guidelines did not significantly
increase award levels in any income group when differences in employment status of pre-and post-
guideline samples were taken into account).
114. See id. tbl.6 (reporting that in Colorado the average award did not increase significantly in
either the lower or upper-income group; in Illinois average award did not increase significantly at the
middle or upper-income level, and the low-income level increase was not statistically siguificant).
115. See P. Bushard, Time Series Impact Assessment of Child Support Guidelines: Support
Awards in Shared Custody Divorces (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State
University), cited in Thoennes, supra note 110, at 343 (concluding that 15% increase in support levels
in shared custody cases after adoption of Arizona child support guidelines was entirely due to a
reduction in zero-dollar awards).
116. For a description of the research findings under discretionary standards, see Garrison,
supra note 79, at 633 n.43 (living standards), 721 tbl.56 (per capita income).
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To be sure, some of the reasons for these results lie outside the
reach of any law governing child support values. Variation in award
levels, for example, results in large part from the process of individual
negotiation that determines the vast majority of child support awards.11
Many parents who negotiate support awards are poorly informed about
the relevant legal standards.1 ' In a large, and apparently growing,
proportion of the cases, lawyer representation is available to only one-
or neither-parent.19 Under these circumstances, the resources"' and
attitudes' of each parent may play important roles in determining child
support outcomes and produce results that bear little relationship to the
outcomes that lawmakers intended to achieve. Aggregate outcomes are
also affected by the failure of many support-eligible parents to seek
awards. More than four out of ten mothers-and more than three-
quarters of those never-married-have not obtained a child support
award."2 Some of these mothers could not find the father or believed
117. Experts generally estimate that no more than 10% of divorce actions involve formal
adjudication. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 108 (1974). However, recent research suggests
that the rate of formal adjudication may vary substantially from one state to the next. Compare
ELEANOR I. MACCOBY & ROBERT . MNOOIUN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 159 (1992) (reporting formal adjudication of approximately 1.5% in
California sample of divorce actions involving minor children), with Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V.
Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 01110 ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 279, 294 tbl.II (1993) (reporting that 5.38% (Wisconsin) and 10.13% (Virginia) of sample
divorce actions went to trial).
118. See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes:
Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 585, 600 (1987) (In divorce negotiations,
"legal constraints are decidedly less important [than emotional and financial issues]"); Herbert Jacob,
The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 565, 584-85 (1992) ("In divorce it seems that
attorneys do not typically conduct the negotiations.... [A]greements are often worked out in private
with very little apparent law talk.").
119. See generally Jessica Pearson, Ten Myths About Family Law, 27 FAM LQ. 279, 281-82
(1993) (reviewing research); Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 123 (1994) (same).
120. See, e.g., Melli, supra note 10, at 1155-56 (reporting that divorcing couples consistently
express concern about legal fees and sometimes settle in order to avoid additional expense);
Thoennes, supra note 110, at 340-41 tbl.10 (finding that legal representation was significantly
correlated with value of child support award at all income levels).
121. One group of researchers, for example, found that the parties' attitudes toward the divorce
was a factor "of some significance" in determining child support outcomes. Custodial parents who
were reluctant to end the marriage and/or whose spouses were impatient to do so obtained
significantly better child support awards than the mean of the group. See Melli, supra note 10, at
1168-71. See also Jay D. Teachman, Socioeconomic Resources of Parents and Award of Child
Support in the United States: Some Exploratory Models, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 689, 697 tbl.3
(1990) (reporting based on data from National Longitudial Study of the High School Class of 1972
that "both the capacity to negotiate and motivation are at work determining the likelihood and size of
[child support] awards").
122. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT FOR
CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 1991, at 6 (Current Population Reports No. P60-187)
[hereinafter 1991 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT] (reporting that 56% of custodial mothers, 41% of
custodial fathers, and 27% of never-married mothers had been awarded child support in 1991).
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that he was unable to pay; others report that they simply did not want to
pursue an award.'2 Thus, even with an excellent rule, the attitudes and
behavior of custodial parents may preclude excellent results.
Moreover, even the best possible child support rule is powerless to
ensure that children are adequately supported when family income is
inadequate. Children who were poor before family dissolution (or
nonformation) will remain poor. Because both divorceu and
nonmarital childbearingls5 are more common among low-income
families, the extent of unpreventable poverty in the support-eligible
population is substantial.126  The problem of preexisting poverty is also
exacerbated by the loss of economies of scale that accompanies family
break-up. Two households cannot live as cheaply as one; thus the
federal poverty level for a family of three is approximately 50% less
than that of a family of one and a family of two.'27 For the family that
123. See id. at 12 tbl.F (showing that, in 1991, 34.0% of custodial parents without support orders
reported simply that they "did not pursue a child support award;" 17.5%, that they "did not want child
support;" 16.5%, that they believed the "other parent [was] unable to pay;" and 17.5%, that they
were "unable to locate [the] other parent"). Recent research suggests that some welfare mothers
forgo a formal child support award in order to maximize their family's potential social and economic
gains from both the AFDC program and the father. See Kathryn Edin, Single Mothers and Child
Support: The Possibilities and Limits of Child Support Policy, 17 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REV.
203,215-16 (1995).
124. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 152-57 (1993)
(summarizing research on the relationship between socioeconomic class and divorce rates); U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FAMILY DISRUPTION AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP:
THE SHORT-RUN PICTURE FOR CHILDREN 2 (Current Population Reports, Series P-70, No. 23) (1991)
(reporting that, among families with children, 21% of those that experienced the loss of the father
from the household during a two-year survey period were already poor, a poverty rate double that of
stable two-parent families in the survey); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERICE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY FORMATION: WHEN HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE,
AND FORM 18-21 (Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 180) (1992) (reporting that divorce is
approximately twice as likely among sample couples with incomes below the poverty line as
compared to others); i.d at 19 thl.l; Rand D. Conger et al., Linking Economic Hardship to Marital
Quality and Instability, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 643, 653-54 (1990) (finding that instability in
husband's work, a drop in family income, and a low ratio of family income to family needs increases
risk of divorce).
125. See, e.g., Elizabeth Phillips & Irwin Garfinkel, Income Growth among Nonresident Fathers:
Evidence from Wisconsin, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 227, 234 tbl.2 (1993) (showing that 41% of never-
married nonresident fathers with tax records were poor in year before support action, as compared to
19% of divorced nonresident fathers).
126. See Marsha Garrison, Child Support and Children's Poverty, 28 FAM. LQ. 475, 492-503
(1994) (reviewing ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT (1993) and DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM
FAMILY, GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1993)) (analyzing limitations of child support policy as
a means of curbing childhood poverty). The problem is not unique to the United States. See Oldham,
supra note 11, at 694-95 (describing empirical data on percentages of low-income child support
obligors in Australia and the U.K.).
127. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 60, at 427 (reporting poverty threshold of $6800
for one individual under 65 and $8794 for two persons with a householder under 65). See also
Betson, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that, if family's total income is unchanged by divorce, its overall
standard of living must necessarily fall due to loss of economies of scale and shared goods).
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had barely averted poverty when together, dissolution ensures that some,
if not all, family members will thereafter be poor. 128
Because of these factors limiting the extent to which a child support
rule can achieve its intended results, the new support guidelines must be
judged primarily on the basis of the results sought rather than those
achieved. But today's guidelines appear to be lacking even by this
measure. First, the level of support mandated frequently does not
protect children from poverty. One recent review, which evaluated all
state guidelines in effect in 1989-90, concludes that none required
lower-income noncustodial parents to provide enough child support to
ensure either a poverty-level or a "minimum decent living" standard
for two children. 129 While this goal might have been unobtainable in
some of the cases to which the guidelines were applied, in others it was
not. A significant number of states also failed to ensure that children in
middle-income families enjoyed a minimum decent living standard. 3
Moreover, awards calculated under the guidelines produced a dramatic
decline in children's living standard as compared to that of the
noncustodial parent. On average, awards under the guidelines reviewed
caused children's living standards to decline by 26% while noncustodial
parents' improved by 34%.131
128. See, e.g., Pirog-Good, supra note 105, at 459.
129. See G. Diane Dodson, Children's Standard of Living Under Child Support Guidelines-
Women's Legal Defense Fund Report Card, in NExT GENERATION, supra note 16, at 95, 98. See also
Donna H. Christensen & Kathryn D. Rettig, Standards of Adequacy of Child Support Awards, 16 1
DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 19, 38 (1991) (reporting that application of Wisconsin guideline would
have provided poverty level living standard for only 42.3% of case sample); Pirog-Good, supra note
105, at 459 (using one estimate of family expenditure for a low income family, guidelines in 14 states
failed to produce an adequate award; using another estimate all guidelines fell short); Ellen B.
Zweibel & Richard Shillington, Child Support Policy: Income Tax Treatment and Child Support
Guidelines (1994), in CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION To FAMILY
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 972, 978 tbl.4.1 (1996) (reporting that under both
income shares and Melson formula more than 75% of low-income custodial parents would have
incomes below poverty line).
130. See Dodson, supra note 129, at 98. Eighteen state guidelines failed to provide a minimum
decent living standard using one middle-income scenario; 21, using another such scenario; 31, using a
third; and 47, using a fourth. "Minimum decent standard of living" was defined as 150% of the
federal poverty level. See id. at 97. See also Pirog-Good, supra note 105, at 459 (using one estimate
of family expenditure for a middle income family, guidelines in 10 states failed to produce an
adequate award; using another estimate all guidelines fell short); Zweibel & Shillington, supra note
129, at 978 tbl.4.1 (reporting that 31% of low middle income custodial parents did not attain poverty
level using both income shares and Melson formulae).
131. See DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 14, at 32 tbl.4-E. See also FAY & READ, supra
note 111, at 7,61 tbl.17 (noting a similar pattern in Alaska); MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 117,
at 257 (reporting that divorced mothers experienced a living standard decline and fathers an
improvement under California's child support guidelines); Betson, supra note 21, at 12 tbl.3 (reporting
that when noncustodial parent earns $20,000 and custodial parent earns $10,000, income shares
guidelines produce ratio of post-divorce to pre-divorce scaled surplus income of 1.24 for
noncustodial household and .41 for custodial household); Rettig, supra note 110, at 171 (reporting,
based on analysis of Minnesota child support cases decided under guidelines, median income-to-
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Today's guidelines fail to meet the Congressional goals that
motivated them. They have not significantly raised award levels; they
fail to prevent children's poverty even when it is preventable; and they
distribute the burden of family dissolution so that children are typically
its primary victims.
C. The Reasons for the Results
The failure of current guidelines to ensure that children do not
bear the brunt of family dissolution is sobering but not
surprising: Current guidelines were not designed either to achieve a
minimum decent living standard for children or to ensure that the
economic burden of family dissolution is equitably distributed; the
methodology that they employ is inherently ill-adapted to
accomplishing either of these other goals.
The estimates of child-related expenditure on which current
guidelines rely are based on predictions of how much more income a
two-parent household, with a given level of expenditure, would need in
order to add a new family member and maintain its standard of living.
But single parents appear to spend a considerably larger fraction of
their incomes on children than do two-parent households.' Moreover,
more than 90% of typical family expenditure represents goods such as
housing, transportation, and utility payments that cannot easily be
allocated to specific family members.3 3  The estimates thus describe
only the marginal, or extra, costs associated with a new family member,
not the per person allocation of family resources."
These marginal cost estimates all derive from one or another
"household equivalence scale," devised by economists to permit living
standard comparisons when households are not the same size. 35 These
needs ratio at date of divorce of 1.77 for custodial households and 1.92 for noncustodial households);
Zweibel & Shillington, supra note 129, at tbl.4.2 (showing disparities in living standards of
noncustodial and custodial households under income shares and Melson support formulae).
132. See BETSON, supra note 100, at 55 (based on 1980-86 CPS data, proportion of total
expenditure spent on two children was 35% in a two-parent and 53% in a one-parent family);
EDWARD P. LAZEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 97
(1988). But see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FAMILY ECONOMICS RESEARCH GROUP,
EXPENDITURES ON A CHILD BY FAMILIES 10 (1992) (concluding that "expenses on a child in single-
parent households are slightly higher than those in two-parent households, probably because of
economies of scale").
133. See BETSON, supra note 100, at 3 (based on 1980-81 Consumer Expenditure Survey, 90%
of total expenditures in families with children represent commodities that could not be assigned to
either children or adults based on the nature of the good).
134. The estimates also rely exclusively on market purchases, ignoring the cost of parental time
devoted to child care that might have been utilized for income production. See id. at 6-8. See also
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 60, at 168.
135. For detailed discussions of the limitations of household equivalence scales, see Charles
Blackorby & David Donaldson, Adult-Equivalence Scales, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being,
and Applied Welfare Economics, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 164 (Jon Elster
1998]
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scales were not intended as a basis for assessing child support, and have
major limitations when used for that purpose.'36 Although their
assumptions and results vary substantially,'37 such scales do offer a basis
for predicting how much more income a family (say, John and Mary)
will need in order to add a new member (Baby, for example) and
maintain its current living standard. 3 ' They also enable us to predict
Baby's standard of living when she joins the family.'39 But they tell us
nothing about Baby's living standard if her parents separate, dividing
the family and its income.Y Unless the same income base is available in
Baby's new household-an unlikely result given prevailing custody
patterns and gender-based wage differentials-her living standard must,
of necessity, change.'' Current child support guidelines thus "severely
penalize children for being in the custody of a parent who has less
income, and reward them for living with the parent who has more. ' z
& John E. Roemer eds., 1991); Angus S. Deaton & John Muellbauer, On Measuring Child Costs: With
Applications to Poor Countries, 94 J. POL. ECON. 720 (1986); Arthur Lewbel, Household Equivalence
Scales and Welfare Comparisons, 39 J. PUB. ECON. 377 (1989); Julie A. Nelson, Household
Equivalence Scales: Theory Versus Policy?, 11 J. LAB. EcON. 471 (1993).
136. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 135, at 474-75 ("The practical usefulness [of household
equivalence scales] in designing child support policy is limited.").
137. One recent comparative analysis, for example, produced estimates of child-related
expenditure in a one-child, two-parent family ranging from 11% to 33% depending on which of four
alternate calculation methods was utilized. See BETSON, supra note 100, at 178-92 (providing
estimates for a family of two parents and one eight-year old child with a $25,000 expenditure level
based on 1980s Consumer Expenditure Survey data). The 11% estimate was derived using the so-
called "Barten-Gorman model," id. at 192 tbl.F15; the 33% estimate using the "Engel model," id. at
178 tbl.F1; the "Rothbarth model" produced an estimate of 25%, id. at 188 tbl.Fll; the ISO-PROP
model an estimate of 18%, id, at 182 tbl.F5. See also Bassi & Barnow, supra note 21, at 480-83, 485
tbl.1 (describing methodologies and showing range of estimates of child-related expense using
various methodologies for different family types).
138. See, e.g., Betson, supra note 21, at 3; Blackorby & Donaldson, supra note 135, at 168;
Nelson, supra note 135, at 473.
139. However, because household equivalence scales typically rely on the assumption that
household members enjoy equal living standards, they may dramatically inflate or underestimate the
well-being of specific individuals. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 122-25
(1992) (discussing how household equivalence scales fail, in various societies and cultures, to
account for dramatic inequalities in intra-family wellbeing based on gender). For an exception to the
equal well-being assumption, see LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 132, at 5.
140. See, e.g., Panos Tsakloglou, Estimation and Comparison of Two Simple Models of
Equivalence Scales for the Cost of Children, 101 ECON. J. 343, 354 (1991) ("[The models.. . are
concerned with the effect of children on the welfare of their parents but do not tell us anything about
the welfare of the children themselves.").
141. See, e.g., Bassi & Barnow, supra note 21, at 494-95 ("Requiring the noncustodial parent to
maintain his or her rate of expenditures on the child is likely to result in the child having a lower
standard of living and might still leave the noncustodial parent with a higher standard of living than he
or she enjoyed prior to the dissolution.").
142. Betson, supra note 21, at 18-19.
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D. Why the Success of the Continuity-of-Expenditure Model?
Given the deficiencies of the continuity-of-expenditure model as a
means of remedying the low support levels that were the primary
motivation behind the guidelines requirement, one obvious question is
why legislatures chose this approach. The deficiencies could easily have
been predicted by anyone with a guideline and calculator in hand;
alternatives were available, most of them no more complex than
continuity-of-expenditure guidelines, and some of them are arguably
simpler.4 1
At first glance, the selection of the continuity-of-expenditure
approach over its competitors is also an odd one. After all, the amount
that a parent did spend on his or her children when the family was intact
bears no obvious or necessary relation to what he should spend now that
the family is separated. Traditional child support law, under which the
support award is based on an assessment of needs, resources, and the
child's prior living standard, implicitly recognized that the past offers
only a partial guide to the determination of a fair support value for the
future. Moreover, for the rapidly growing segment of the support-
eligible population born outside of marriage, there is no past.'" Most
nonmarital children have never lived in an intact household. 45 For these
children, the replication of past expenditure patterns is pure fiction.
143. Some proponents of continuity-of-expenditure type guidelines have been quite frank about
the limitations inherent in the underlying methodology. In describing the development of the
percentages utilized in the "percentage-of-obligor-income" formula, for example, its primary authors
acknowledge that:
[u]ltimately, the determination of how much the nonresident parent should pay depends
upon value judgments on balancing conflicting objectives: providing well for the children,
minimizing public costs, and retaining incentives with a decent standard of living for the
nonresident parent. Establishing a child support standard cannot be a purely scientific
exercise.
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 16, at 168.
144. 30.1% of U.S. births were to never-married mothers in 1992, as compared to 10.7% in
1970. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 60, at 77 tbl.94. As a result of this trend, the percentage of
child support-eligible mothers who have never been married has risen rapidly. Compare 1991 CHILD
SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 122, at 3 tbl.A (showing that, in 1991, 25.9% of custodial mothers had
never been married), with 1978 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 tbl.B (showing that, in
1978, 19% of custodial mothers had never been married).
145. See, e.g., Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Children's Experience in Single-Parent
Families: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions, 21 FAm. PLAN. PmpSs'. 256, 256
(1989) (reporting that only 27 percent of nonmarital births between 1970 and 1984 were to cohabiting
couples); Andrew J. Cherlin, The Weakening Link Between Marriage and the Care of Children, 20
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 302, 303 (1988) (estimating that 22% of white and 12% of black children under
six living with an unmarried mother have an adult nonrelative in the home). By contrast, in Sweden a
higher proportion of births are nonmarital (in 1986, 48.4%), but most of the mothers are living with
the child's father. See MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 273 (1989); David Popenoe, Beyond
the Nuclear Family: A Statistical Portrait of the Changing Family in Sweden, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAm.
173, 175-76 (1987).
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One probable reason for the model's success is simply false
advertising. Its proponents claimed that continuity-of-expenditure
formulae would significantly raise support levels and thus benefit
children, their custodial parents, and the public; they also claimed that
these improvements could be achieved with awards that tax noncustodial
parents with payments that do not exceed their prior child-related
expenses.'46 These claims, that offer benefits to all and harm none,
surely played a role in the continuity-of-expenditure model's political
success.
The model's explicit segregation of child-related and parental
expenditure provides another reason for its success. With alimony
increasingly viewed as a temporary, need-based remedy, policy makers
may have found it "culturally unacceptable" to define the child
support obligation in a way that links a benefit to the child with an
improvement in the economic circumstances of a former spouse.47 The
continuity-of-expenditure model thus reflects, and reinforces, the
increased tension between alimony and child support.
The success of the continuity-of-expenditure model 'may also
reflect a preference for the individualist approach of the Common Law
over the sharing norm derived from the Civil Law tradition.'48 The
model's methodology, like the Common Law rules, implicitly assumes
that a parent's income belongs to the individual rather than the family
unit. 49 Viewed from this perspective, child support represents a taking
of resources from its owner to benefit a third party, and one would
expect a rule that prefers the owner's interests. Many of the alternative
child support models that were available rely on the Civil Law sharing
norm now applicable to marriage. The equal outcomes model seeks to
achieve equality among family members, implicitly assuming that each
is equally entitled to parental income; the utilitarian approach, which
attempts to maximize the aggregate well-being of family members,
146. See sources cited supra note 85.
147. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05(h) (Preliminary Draft No. 4 1993) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION] ("to require ... [the] noncustodial parent, in the
guise of child support, [to] assume responsibility for the custodial parent... [is] culturally
unacceptable"); Carol S. Bruch, Problems Inherent in Designing Child Support Guidelines, in
ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 48 ("[S]ome policy makers... find the possibility
of what they term 'hidden alimony' onerous enough to justify abandoning efforts to protect fully the
child's standard of living."); Bassi & Barnow, supra note 21, at 495 n.33 ("We suspect that the states
reject the more generous equity concepts because the custodial parent would benefit significantly as
well as the child .... [Miany state legislatures would consider such a result to be unfair in that it
essentially provides the custodial parent with the equivalent of alimony as well as child support.").
148. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
149. For a detailed discussion of the autonomy assumption, property rhetoric, and post-divorce
obligations between spouses, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations
and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEo. L.J. 2303 (1994).
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similarly assumes that no family member has a stronger claim to family
income than does any other.
Evidence of a preference for the Common Law approach can be
found in the so-called "self-support reserve" feature of many
guidelines, which establishes an income level (typically the federal
poverty level for a one-person household) below which the guideline
values do not apply.50 The self-support reserve has no counterpart in
traditional child support law; indeed, empirical research has shown that
child support awards under traditional standards were regressive, with
low-income parents typically paying greater proportions of their
incomes in child support than high-income parents.' It is not even
consistent with a continuity-of-expenditure methodology; poor parents
in intact families share income with their children just as do wealthier
parents. The prevalence of this feature thus suggests a tendency to view
parental income as parental entitlement.
The elevation of individualist over sharing goals may not, however,
reflect a conscious choice of values. The Massachusetts state child
support commission, for example, declared its preference for income-
equalization "as the method that best addressed the [problem of]
disparity of living standards," rejecting this approach simply because of
the fear that it "would provide a disincentive for both parents work."''
The evidence also suggests that many policy makers were poorly
informed about the goals and capabilities of the continuity-of-
expenditure approach. A memorandum explaining New York's
continuity-of-expenditure type guideline, for example, describes the
primary purpose of child support as "the maintenance of the child's
150. Both the income shares and Melson formulae include a self-support reserve for the obligor.
Almost no guidelines provide a support reserve for the custodial parent. See DODSON &
ENTMACHER, supra note 14, at 49-53; Williams, Guidelines, supra note 101, at 305 tbl.4. The English
and Australian child support formulae also provide a self-support reserve for the support obligor. See
Oldham, supra note 11, at 713.
151. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 262-69 (1985) (reporting
regressive child support awards in California divorce sample); Garrison, supra note 79, at 718 tbl.53
(reporting significant negative relationship between percentage of obligor income awarded in
combined child support and alimony and obligor's income in New York divorce sample); James B.
McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21
FAM. L.Q. 351, 371-72 (1987) (reporting regressive child support awards in Connecticut divorce
sample).
152. Marilyn R. Smith & Jon Laramore, Massachusetts' Child Support Guidelines: A Model for
Development, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 267, 273. See also Karen
Czapanskiy, Foreward, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 22, at 5, 6 (noting that
participants at national child support conference concluded that "the primary goal of child support is
to serve the best interests of the child" and that "[many conferees agreed that the best method [of




standard of living"-a goal, as we have seen, that this guideline type
could not possibly meet.'53
In short, we can be confident that the continuity-of-expenditure
approach was doomed to failure from the start and that its selection
reflected the not uncommon legislative desire for a no-cost, pain-free
solution. But we cannot be sure that its selection was the product of
careful reflection on the fundamental issues of justice that underlie the
selection of a child support guideline model.
There are two different approaches one might employ in resolving
these underlying issues of justice. One method treats child support
policy as a question of distributive justice, focusing on the
determination of which child support principles are most fair to the
parties involved. Another is the familiar approach of policy science and
political debate, that proceeds by articulating and critiquing goals,
assumptions, expected outcomes, and implementational problems.
These methods are not, of course, mutually exclusive. On many issues
of public concern-taxation, affirmative action, welfare policy-we
routinely employ both types of analysis. This dual approach is the one
I will utilize here. The next section analyzes child support policy as a
question of distributive justice; the section that follows utilizes a policy
science approach.
II
CHILD SUPPORT AS DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: ISSUES AND THEORIES
A. The Family and Justice
Plato recommended its abolition." Cicero extolled it as the
seedbed of the state.' 55 Rousseau recommended it as the first, and
foremost, source of moral education.'56 From ancient times to modern,
the nuclear family has been recognized as a basic, powerful, and
potentially disruptive element of civil society. Combining hierarchy
with unity and inequality with altruistic self-denial, family relationships
both shape and mirror the society in which they are set.
153. GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL MEMORANDUM: CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACr, (1989),
reprinted in NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 1989, at 250. See also PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 147, at §§ 3.03(1), 3.05 (describing "most important" goal
of child support as "ensur[ing] that the child share ... equitably in the incomes of both parents" and
adopting income shares guideline methodology).
154. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 155-68 (Francis M. Cornford ed. & trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1955) (advocating abolition of private homes and families for guardian class).
155. See CICERO ON MORAL OBLIGATION 58 (John Higginbotham trans., Univ. of Calif. Press
1967).
156. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 12-20 (William H. Payne ed. & trans., D. Appleton
and Co. 1898).
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Because of its primacy, political philosophers have written
extensively about the parent-child relationship.'57 At least since the
Enlightenment, they have tended to assume that parents owe to their
children an obligation of care, protection, and education.'58 But
agreement on the existence of parental obligation has not produced a
uniform theory (or even an array of competing accounts) of either the
extent of parental obligation or its relationship to marital and
community obligations. 9
One explanation for this theoretical gap can be found in the
tendency to assume that family relationships are governed by altruism
rather than by the constraints of formal justice.'1 Although this
tendency has abated in contemporary discussions of marriage,' it is still
dominant in discussions of the parent-child tie.' The large
contemporary literature on issues of intergenerational justice, for
example, admits the possibility of resource conflict between the young
and old as generational groups, but almost invariably assumes parental
altruism within the family.'63 Indeed, the probability of a parent's
partiality toward his or her own offspring is often described as a major
157. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 24, at 22-98 (summarizing the literature); Ross, supra note 24, at
124-35 (same).
158. See BLUSTmN, supra note 24, at 63-90; DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND
CHILDHOOD 8 (1993).
159. For summaries and analyses of some main themes, see BLUSTEIN, supra note 24, at 99-138
and Ross, supra note 24, at 124-35.
160. See, e g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 181, 309, 312 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 154, at 165-66.
161. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 27, at 134-69; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERIS OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 227-42 (1983); Onora O'Neill, Justice, Gender, and
International Boundaries, in THE QuALuY OF LIFE 303 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds.,
1993).
162. See, e.g., CHARLES FRmD, RIGHT AND WRONG 155 (1978) (observing that when a child is
bom, the parents' sense of autonomy is enlarged to include the child, so that "use of autonomy is the
model for the deepest form of altruism"); FRIEDRICH A. IHAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 91
(1960) (arguing that in certain circumstances, justice requires making use of "the natural partiality of
parents for their children"); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167 (1974) ("[I]t is
not appropriate to enforce across the wider society the relationships of love and care appropriate
within a family...."); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 292 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE] (describing assumption of "ties of sentiment" between generations); MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE Lusrrs oF JUSrICE 33 (1982) (describing "the more or less ideal
family situation, where relations are governed in large part by spontaneous affection" and where an
appeal to justice "is preempted by a spirit of generosity"); Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the
Generations, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 89 (Peter Laslett & James S.
Fishkin eds., 1993) ("Individuals ... have heavily interdependent utility functions with their offspring.
The most powerful source of this interdependence ... is genetic connection, which induces parents to
take into account the utility of their children (and the reverse as well) in making decisions about
present and future consumption") (footnote omitted).
163. For an introduction to the literature, see the various essays collected in JUSTICE ACROSS
GENERATIONS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? (Lee M. Cohen ed., 1993); JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS
AND GENERATIONS, supra note 162; OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (R.I. Sikora & Brian
Barry eds., 1978).
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impediment to the achievement of equality within an age cohort and
between successive generations.' 6
Contemporary philosophy offers little more on the extent and
nature of parental obligation than do the classical theorists. Even those
whose primary focus is children's rights have failed to answer-or even
ask-the question of how much a parent owes to his child, to the child's
other parent, and to society. 65 In constructing child support principles,
we cannot rely on an established account, or even choose from among
competing accounts, of parental obligation.
B. Child Support as a Problem of Distributive Justice
While we lack an established ethic of parental obligation, we have a
rich philosophical literature on distributive justice that might guide the
development of child support principles. The problem of child support
is, after all, a question of fair allocation: a finite resource, family
income, must be divided between two households, each of which is
headed by a parent and at least one of which includes a child (or
children).
The distributive problem posed by child support combines features
of what Jon Elster has aptly described as global and local justice.'66
Global justice theories have as their main object the overall design of
society, while local theories concern the allocation of a particular good
or burden-organs for transplantation, for example-in a specific
context involving imbalance between supply and demand. 67 Global
theories do not necessarily offer clear answers to problems of local
justice; thus some global theorists have specifically disclaimed the
applicability of a global design to local problems.'61
164. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 201-27 (1980);
JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983); James S. Fishkin, The
limits ofIntergenerational Justice, in JuSTicE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS, supra
note 162, at 62, 73-78.
165. The central concern of children's rights theorists has been the extent of children's
autonomy as decision makers. As a result, children's substantive rights as members of a family or
community have received short shrift. For representative examples of the children's rights literature,
see WILLIAM AIXEN & HUGH LAFOLLETTE, WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL
AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER (1980); ARCHARD, supra note 158; RICHARD FARSON,
BIRTHRIGHTS (1974).
166. JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE: HOW INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS AND
NECESSARY BURDENS (1992); Jon Elster, Local Justice and Interpersonal Comparisons, in
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 135, at 99.
167. Elster's examples include, in addition to that of organ allocation, the decision about whom to
induct into military service, and the choice of workers to lay off in a recession. See ELSTER, supra
note 166, at 1.
168. See, e.g., RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 162, at 8 (noting that "(t]here is no
reason to suppose ahead of time that the principles satisfactory for the basic structure [of society]
hold for all cases").
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Child support, at first glance, poses only local issues: The problem
arises in a single context involving parent(s) and child(ren) who live
apart. But the good to be allocated, money income, is the family's most
basic resource. Its distribution will largely determine the commodities,
opportunities, and status each family member can attain. The problem
of income allocation within the "little commonwealth" of the (divided)
family"6 9 thus closely resembles, on a smaller scale, the distribution of
primary goods with which global theories of distributive justice are
concerned.
The distribution of power and resources within the family will both
mirror and shape that of the larger commonwealth in which it is
situated; "[the family.., reproduces the structures of kinship in the
larger world [and may, for example] ... impose[] what we currently call
'sex roles' upon a range of activities to which sex is entirely
irrelevant."'70 It is no accident that in societies with a tradition of male
supremacy, families typically discriminate against their female members,
or that hierarchical societies tend to produce hierarchical families. 7'
The distribution of familial power and resources will play a vital role in
determining the status and opportunities of family members within the
larger commonwealth. If, for example, the family's male children
obtain all its educational resources and the female children none, the
children's prospects outside the family will vary dramatically.
Although adult family members will not be immune from the effects of
such discrimination, the most powerful effect will be on children.
The family also serves as one of society's primary sources of moral
education. It is in the family that we first encounter issues relating to
the allocation of goods and responsibilities, of power, and of justice. It
is here that we first learn to "put ourselves into another's place and find
out what we would do in his position." 72
Because of the primacy of the family, as a determinant of societal
structure as well as the individual opportunities and values of family
members, global theories of distributive justice would seem particularly
appropriate for determining the allocation of family resources. Indeed,
the interdependence of the family and larger commonwealth is a major
source of traditional philosophical interest in the family.
169. See LOCKE, supra note 160, at 323.
170. WALZER, supra note 161, at 240.
171. See, e.g., Barbara Harriss, Intrafamily Distribution of Hunger in South Asia, in 1 THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUNGER 351 (Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen eds., 1991) (study of food
allocation in primitive South Asian society); Hanna Papanek, To Each Less than She Needs, From
Each More than She Can Do: Allocations, Entitlements and Value, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES:
WOMEN AND vORLD DEVELOPMErNT 162 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) (study of women's survival in
South Asia).
172. RAwLs, THEORY OF JusrcE, supra note 162, at 469.
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C. Three Types of Distributive Justice Theories
Contemporary philosophy offers several global theories of
distributive justice that might guide the development of child support
principles. The rule-making authority might opt for a division based on
either a contractarian, consequentialist, or libertarian account of
distributive justice; it could also rely on an intuitional approach, such as
communitarianism or feminism, that combines features drawn from
these various approaches or provides a distinctive emphasis.'
1. Consequentialist Child Support Principles: Utility and Equality
The two most prominent consequentialist theories of distributive
justice today are utilitarianism and egalitarianism.
a. Utilitarian Child Support
Utilitarian theories vary in their details, but uniformly claim that
resources should be distributed in a way that will maximize the good, or
utility, that can be achieved. Classical utilitarianism, developed by John
Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, described individual happiness as the
ultimate good;74 modem utilitarians have variously championed one or
another notion of welfare or well-being.75
The problem with using welfare maximization as the basis of a
child support rule is that we lack reliable, uncontroversial means of
making interpersonal welfare comparisons, or even of measuring the
relationship between an individual's income and his own welfare. These
173. Feminism and communitarianism are probably the most prominent intuitional approaches
today; both are increasingly represented in philosophical and public discourse. While they offer
distinctive perspectives, they share an emphasis on the variability of justice. See WALZER, supra note
161, at 6 (arguing "that the principles of [distributive] justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that
different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different
procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from ... historical and cultural
particularism"); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL
EDUCATION 5 (1984) (rejecting "principles and rules as the major guide to ethical behavior [along
with] ... the notion of universalizability.... Since so much depends on the subjective experience of
those involved in ethical encounters, conditions are rarely 'sufficiently similar' for me to declare that
you must do what I must do.") As a result of this emphasis on particularism, as well as the wide
variety of views encompassed within each perspective, I have treated their probable approaches to
child support policy only briefly in notes 204 and 205.
174. "Actions are right.... " Mill declared, "as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they
tend to produce the reverse of happiness." JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Oskar Piest ed.,
Bobbs-Merril Educ. Pub. 1957) (1863). For a collection of readings illustrating the historical
development of the utility concept, see ALFRED N. PAGE, UTILITY THEORY: A BOOK OF READINGS
(1968).
175. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 214-23 (1979);
JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (1986).
See also Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 689-93 (1993) (summarizing recent
developments in utility theory).
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difficulties have led some experts to conclude that utilitarianism is
incapable of providing a determinate resource allocation standard.1 76
Others have argued that, given the lack of a precise individual or
interpersonal income-to-welfare metric, it makes sense to assume that
individual income-to-welfare curves are equal (each individual derives
the same level of well-being from the same amount of income) and that
the marginal utility of money declines at a constant rate (the more
dollars you have, the less each additional dollar is worth to you). 17 If
one uses these simplifying assumptions, a utilitarian approach yields an
equal income distribution."7
A utilitarian child support formula would, of necessity, rely on
these simplifying assumptions. To take account of economies of scale
affecting the income-to-welfare curves of individual family members, it
would also be necessary to employ a household equivalence scale.179
The resulting rule would favor the household with the larger number of
family members who can derive benefit from its income,"' yielding a
formula that sets the child support value at the point where the
noncustodial household's welfare loss from the next dollar of income
exactly equals the custodial household's welfare gain. Economist David
Betson has calculated one such welfare-maximization formula; for a
one-child family, it produces a ratio of pre- to post-divorce scaled
surplus income of .82 for the custodial household and .59 for the
noncustodial household.'81
Because the utilitarian values each family member's welfare
equally, the welfare-maximization formula would not include either a
self-support reserve for the support obligor or a surtax designed to
prevent the child's welfare dependence and/or poverty.' 2 But, because
the utilitarian is concerned with consequences, the formula would take
176. See, e.g., John Broome, Utilitarian Metaphysics?, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING, supra note 135, at 70; John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen
Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 135, at 255.
177. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgements, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECriVES ON JusTIcE, supra note 35, at 109, 114-17 (describing utilitarian applications of
principle of declining marginal utility to allocation of goods). While the declining marginal utility of
money principle is undeniably valid in many cases (i.e., $100 is "worth" more to the beggar than the
billionaire), economists do not all agree that the marginal utility of money invariably declines,
particularly for small changes in income. The marginal utility assumption is nonetheless prominent in
the public finance and social welfare literature. See Betson, supra note 21, at 9 n.14.
178. See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 175, at 312-16; R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS,
METHOD, AND POINT 165-66 (1981).
179. See supra notes 135-141 and accompanying text (explaining function of household
equivalence scales).
180. See, e.g., Betson, supra note 21, at 9-10.
181. Id.at9n.16.
182. One could make a utilitarian case for preferring the interests of children to those of parents,
given the greater potential of a child-related investment to enhance productivity and well-being (both
for the child and society at large) over the long run.
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account of all factors that could be reliably predicted to enhance
aggregate family well-being. For example, it would sanction a current
income reduction, such as that resulting from an educational investment
or career shift, which would likely produce a large gain in future
income. It would also take account of work (dis)incentives. 13 The work
incentives problem derives from the fact that, if each parent stands to
lose a large portion of the benefit from new income-a result that the
pure welfare-maximization formula outlined above logically requires-
each parent's incentive to produce more income is markedly reduced.
The pure formula would thus require modification to create the work
incentives needed to maximize aggregate family income.
A utilitarian approach would also sanction modifications of the
basic support formula that would serve to maximize social, rather than
familial, welfare. For example, if the rulemaking authority determined
that parental investments in children's education would produce a large
social welfare gain, it might sanction either a support surcharge or a
reduction in current support payments in order to finance such an
investment.
In the end, a utilitarian support formula would look much like the
equal outcomes approach, except that it would permit income retention
by either parent that would ultimately increase aggregate family income
or social welfare."
b. Egalitarian Child Support
"All hold that justice is some kind of equality," claimed
Aristotle,18 and many contemporary distributive justice theorists have
agreed. As a principle of global justice, contemporary egalitarians have
argued that the appropriate goal is ensuring tolerably equal life chances;
to meet this goal, they have urged equality of basic resources,
opportunity, or capability.186 Using this approach, an egalitarian child
183. A number of commentators have rejected the equal outcomes approach because of its
potential to create significant work disincentives. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, supra note 147, at § 3.05(h) (rejecting equal outcomes approach to child support based
on "substantial work disincentive for the custodial parent"); Barbara Bergmann, Setting Appropriate
Levels of Child-Support Payments, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION, supra note 84, at
116 (rejecting "income-sharing formulas [because they] embody no presumption that the custodial
mother will take paid work"); Smith & Laramore, supra note 152, at 273 (choosing not to adopt an
"income-equalization approach" because "it would provide a disincentive for both parents to work").
184. See BRANDT, supra note 175, at 310-22 (outlining utilitarian income distribution plan and
arguing that it would require equal after-tax incomes except for "(a) supplements to meet special
needs, (b) supplements recompensing services to the extent needed to provide desirable [work]
incentive and allocate resources efficiently and (c) variations to achieve other socially desirable ends
such as population control").
185. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1282 b18, quoted in EIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 1 (1991).
186. See RAKOWSKI, supra note 185, at 19, 73 (favoring equality based on receipt of "equally
valuable opportunities and unowned resources"); SEN. supra note 139, (favoring equality of
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support principle would aim at ensuring relatively equal income-based
opportunities for each family member.
There are two problems with applying this approach. First, while a
focus on opportunities naturally lends itself to comparisons between
agemates who are competing for the same resource pie at the same
developmental stage, this approach is far more difficult to apply across
generations.'8 Individuals in different generations will not necessarily
enjoy access to the same level of resources at a particular developmental
point or across their respective life spans; nor, in competing with each
other for social resources, will they be able to utilize them to obtain the
same advantages. 88  Given these problems, some contemporary
egalitarians have argued that intergenerational comparisons should be
made on a "whole lives" basis.189 Others claim that whole lives
comparisons ignore important inequalities between individuals and that
a "time-slice" or other point of reference is additionally required.'1
Thus, while we can be confident that an egalitarian child support
formula would demand equal opportunity for all children within one
capability); WALZER, supra note 161, at 20 (favoring "complex equality" that produces an open-
ended distributive principle requiring that "[n]o social good x should be distributed to men and women
who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of
x"); Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989)
(favoring equality of opportunity for welfare); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,
99 ETHICS 906-33 (1989) (favoring equal access to advantage); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?
Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (favoring equality of resources);
Amartya K. Sen, The Standard of Living: Lecture 1, Lives and Capabilities, in THE STANDARD OF
LIVING 20, 36-38 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 1987) (urging consideration of a capability standard).
For useful comparisons of the various formulations, see G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare,
Goods, and Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 161, at 9; Amartya Sen, Capabilities
and Well-Being, in THE QUALrrTY OF Lim, supra note 161, at 30.
187. See Norman Daniels, The Prudential Lifespan Account of Justice Across Generations, in
JUSTICE ACROSS GENERATIONS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?, supra note 163, at 197, 199 ("[l]f we treat
the young one way as a matter of policy and the old another, and we do so over their whole lives,
then we treat all persons the same way. No inequality between persons is produced since each
person is treated both ways in the course of a complete life. Thus the banal fact that we age means
age is different from race or sex for purposes of distributive justice.").
188. For example, we would not typically think that inequality between the young and old in
access to education is a meaningful form of inequality.
189. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 69 (1991); Dworkin, supra note
186, at 304-05. Rawls also appears to espouse the "whole lives" view. See RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 162, at 78, 92-95.
190. See NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARErrs' KEEPER? AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN
THE YOUNG AND THE OLD (1988) (arguing in favor of "prudential life span" account of generational
equity in which intergenerational comparisons are based on a prudential distribution of lifetime
resources over the different temporal stages of a single life); Daniels, supra note 187 (same). See
also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 339-45 (1984) (arguing against whole lives perspective
based on its assumption that hardship during one phase of life is compensable in another); Dennis
McKerlie, Justice Between Neighboring Generations, in JUSTICE ACROSS GENERATIONS: WHAT
DOES IT MEAN?, supra note 163, at 215, 225 ("There are constraints on just distribution between age
groups that are independent of, and can compete with, the concern for fairness in terms of complete
lives.").
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family, we cannot be certain how it would assess the claims of a
noncustodial parent and his children. An egalitarian formula might
require poor parents to pay more support than others in order to avoid
an adverse impact on the child's future life prospects; 9' or the provision
of minimum support might be viewed as a community responsibility in
cases where family income is insufficient to provide all family members
with minimally adequate support.
A second problem lies in the measurement of equality. While
contemporary egalitarians agree that the appropriate focus is on the
achievement of relatively equal life chances, there is no more consensus
on how such prospects should be measured, or on the relationship
between those prospects and income distribution, than there is among
utilitarians on how to make interpersonal welfare comparisons." While
equalization of the dollar incomes of each family member would not
necessarily be required to meet egalitarian concerns, it would be
necessary for the legislature to choose one or another egalitarian metric.
Here there are any number of possibilities. A narrow approach to equal
opportunity might produce a child support rule aimed at ensuring that
each family member's basic needs are met.93 A broader approach to
equal opportunity would, once again, produce something akin to the
equal outcomes model.94
2. A Contractarian Child Support Principle
A contractarian views society as a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage among self-interested persons. A just distribution of re-
sources is that distribution to which those self-interested individuals
would freely agree."5 While the notion of a social contract dates back to
191. This approach would be easier to justify within an egalitarian framework if the parent had
enjoyed minimally adequate support as a child.
192. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353
(1982); G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE, supra note 161, at 9.
193. See, e.g., RAKOWSKI, supra note 185, at 154-56, 159 (arguing that parents have an
obligation to provide their children with a "basic bundle of resources," but that "gifts from parents to
children [in excess of the basic bundle] ought to be regarded largely as instances of good brute luck
from the children's perspective and treated accordingly"). For a detailed discussion of the needs
concept and its relationship to egalitarian justice, see DAVID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS 32-75,
138-50 (1987).
194. For a detailed exposition of the concept of the standard of living and its relationship to social
justice, see THE STANDARD OF LIVING, supra note 186. For examples of alternative means of
measuring standard of living, see Robert Erikson, Descriptions of Inequality: The Swedish Approach
to Welfare Research, in THm QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 161, at 67 (describing Swedish "level of
living" scale and survey); B.M.S. van Praag, The Relativity of the Welfare Concept, in THE QUALITY
OF LIFE, supra note 161, at 362, 367-68 (describing "income evaluation questionnaire" method of
evaluating individual welfare).
195. See, e.g., RAWLS, THEORY OF JUsTIcE, supra note 162, at 13 (discussing the choice of first
principles).
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Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau,196 the most influential contemporary
contractarian is John Rawls. Rawls's distinctive contribution to the clas-
sical social contract tradition was to posit a hypothetical "original posi-
tion of equality" from which the contractors would choose the
principles by which society will be ordered. Rawls allows the contrac-
tors knowledge of "whatever general facts [might] affect the[ir] choice
of... principles," including politics, economics, social organization,
and human psychology, 197 but denies them knowledge of their own in-
dividual abilities and status.'98 He asserts that an agreement so made
would be just because of its basis in an impartial process that gives each
contractor equal knowledge and power. He also asserts that, under these
constrained circumstances, the contractors would opt for what he terms a
"maximin" approach to the distribution of social and economic ine-
qualities; under the maximin approach, inequalities are permitted only
to the extent that they benefit the least advantaged group. 9
Applied to the problem of child support,"o the maximin approach
would yield something like the equal outcomes model with income
196. See, e.g., J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS
DEVELOPMENT (1936) (surveying the historical development of the social contract tradition).
197. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 162, at 137.
198. See m. at 12 ("Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place
in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.... The principles of justice are
chosen behind a veil of ignorance."). See also id. at 136-50 (offering a detailed account of the
original position).
199. See id. at 14-15, 151-52. In its fullest form Rawls states the principle as requiring that
"[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Id. at 302.
200. Rawls himself specifically disclaims the applicability of the maxim in principle to issues
other than the basic structure of society and likely would disavow its use as a measure of fair child
support. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 31, at 261; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 162, at 8-9. InA Theory of Justice, Rawls avoids all problems of intrafamilial justice by
presuming that persons in the original position represent family lines, with ties of sentiment between
successive generations. ID. at 128-29, 146. Susan Okin has ably criticized Rawls's failure to take
account of gender inequalities within the family. See OKIN, supra note 27. See also Linda R.
Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L REv. 1860 (1994);
Linda C. McClan, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,
65 S. CAL. L REV. 1171 (1992). My own adaptation of Rawls's methodology draws on Okin's
revision of Rawls and extends it to the parent-child relationship.
In recent years, Rawls himself has expressed the belief that his theory is applicable to "problems
of gender and the family" (RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 31, at xxix), and has now
offered an account of how the theory does apply. See Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 32. He
states that "[t]he family is part of the basic structure since one of its main rules is to be the basis of the
orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to the next," (id. at
787), and notes that, although "[t]he principles of political justice are... not to apply directly to the
internal life of the... family .... they do impose essential constraints on the family as an institution."
Id. at 789. Thus, while "we are not required to treat our children in accordance with political
principles[,] ... the principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as
society's future citizens have basic rights as such." Id. at 790-91. These constraints appear to apply
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maximization incentives. Rawls's conclusion that rational contractors
would select a maximin approach is not uncontroversial; some
commentators have argued that rational contractors would select a
different distributive principle-a utilitarian approach, or utilitarianism
with a floor constraint."' But this controversy appears to be largely
insignificant for purposes of child support policy. As utilitarianism also
yields a child support policy aimed at equal outcomes with income
maximization incentives, we would obtain pretty much the same result
under either approach.
3. Contractarian and Consequentialist Child Support: Similarities and
Differences
Differences between the contractarian and consequentialist models
emerge from variation in the range of goals that might justify
modification of the basic equal outcomes model. While the utilitarian
legislator would focus on welfare maximization, the Rawlsian legislator
would focus on enhancing the opportunities of those with the least
opportunity.2' Thus the Rawlsian rulemaking authority might modify
the equal outcomes support value downward for high-income obligors
to economic inequalities occasioned by family dissolution, as Rawls notes that "[i]t seems intolerably
unjust that a husband may depart the family taking his earning power with him and leaving his wife
and chidiren far less advantaged than before.... A society that permits this does not care about
women, much less about their equality, or even about their children, who are its future." Id. at 794.
But issues of justice within the family, according to Rawls, are not necessarily to be decided on the
basis of those principles applicable to society as a whole: "As citizens we have reasons to impose the
constraints specified by the political principles of justice on associations; while as members of
associations we have reaons for limiting those constraints so that they leave room for a free and
flourishing internal life appropriate to the association in question. Here again we see the need for the
division of labor between different kinds of principles. We wouldn't want political princples of
justice-including principles of distributive justice-to apply directly to the internal life of the
family." Id. at 790.
201. See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique
of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 594, 600 (1975) (concluding that contractors would
opt for the principle of average utility); Roger E. Howe & John E. Roemer, Rawlsian Justice as the
Core of A Game, 71 AM. ECoN. REv. 880 (1981) (concluding that contractors exhibiting moderate
degree of risk aversion would opt for unconstrained income maximization with a floor constraint).
See also DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 14, 205, 235, 264-65 (1986) (arguing that
rational contractor would opt for the Lockean proviso (i.e., the principle that one must not better
one's own situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another), the market, and a
principle of "minimax relative concession," requiring that the greatest bargaining concession,
measured as a proportion of the difference between the least the conceder might accept in place of
no agreeement and the most he might receive in place of being excluded by others from agreement,
be as small as possible). Gauthier does not explain how, if at all, the minimax relative concession
principle applies to the distribution of social resources. See David Braybrooke, Social Contract
Theory's Fanciest Flight, 97 ETHICS 750, 758-59 (1987) (arguing that Gauthier's theory cannot be
used for real world policy-making.)
202. See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 162, at 302-03.
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if support at that level unduly advantaged their children as compared to
children with the least opportunity.2°3
But the most notable fact to emerge from a comparison of the
contractarian and consequentialist approaches to child support policy is
the uniformity of their results. Whether we apply a utilitarian,
egalitarian, or contractarian perspective, we obtain a sharing norm as a
governing principle and some variant of the equal outcomes model-
most probably with an income-maximization feature, perhaps with floor
constraint, perhaps with one or another modification to meet important
social goals-as a decision-making rule. While the exact contours of a
feminist2  or a communitarian"s support policy are more difficult to
203. See id. at 277-78 (noting that purpose of taxation should be "gradually and continually to
correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value
of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity" and maintaining that "inheritance is permissible
provided that the resulting inequalities are to the advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with
liberty and fair equality of opportunity").
204. Feminist thinkers have tended to emphasize norms based on reciprocity and caring, with
care "held to encompass a range of characteristic dispositions, such as concern for the other not out
of duty or obligation but out of feeling or sympathy; attention or attentiveness; sensitivity to the needs
of others, and more strongly, taking the others' interests as equal to or more important than one's
own ... and an orientation to the common interest of the family or of those who are close or related
to one." Carol C. Gould, Feminism and Democratic Community Revisited, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY: XXXV NoMos 396, 404 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). They have
also tended to see the maternal relation as a normative model. See, e.g., NODDINGS, supra note 173;
SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARDS A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989); Virginia Held,
Mothering Versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF-Irrsnsr 287 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). These
various tendencies all point to a child support model that would equally weight the claims of children
and other family members. But, given feminism's central concern with the way that traditional
marriage and child rearing perpetuate gender inequalities, a feminist analysis might well focus on
obligations between parents more than does either a contractarian or consequentialist approach. See,
e.g., OKIN, supra note 27; Carbone, supra note 88.
205. While communitarian thinkers are a diverse group, they uniformly favor a deemphasis on
abstract individual rights; they tend to emphasize the individual's embeddedness in various
communities of interest, such as the family. For representative examples of the philosphical
literature, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JusTICE (1982); Charles Taylor, Atomism & What's Wrong with
Negative Liberty?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187-210,
211-29 (1985); WALZER, supra note 161. Communitarians typically favor legal rules that protect
communities and their values. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, THE NEw
REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984, at 15-17 (explaining that communitarians would be more likely than rights-
based liberals to favor rules that ban pornography when it offends a community's way of life and
rules that disallow plant closings that would devastate communities). Some stress the importance of
traditions related to social roles, such as parenting, as a source of ethical norms. See, e.g.,
MACINTYRE, supra, at 17, 187, 192-93. A communitarian account of the child support obligation thus
would probably stress the importance of rules emphasizing the primacy of the family as an institution
over the individual "rights" of its members; this viewpoint dovetails nicely with an account of the
support obligation as derived from family membership. But because communitarians are a diverse
group and have not developed a clear methodological approach, it is difficult to offer a more detailed
account. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modem Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L
REV. 687, 692-701 (1994) (sketching and critiquing the communitarian values from a liberal
perspective).
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discern, both of these approaches can also be employed to generate a
similar model.
The uniform results of these varied approaches derive from a
common emphasis on group membership as the primary determinant of
a distributional principle.2 Because of that emphasis, none of the
models emphasizes obligations to the other parent or to society as a
source of support principles, nor is it clear what role these obligations
might play in a child support policy.' None assumes that individuals
have economic entitlements that trump the needs of the family group.
And none yields principles even remotely resembling current
continuity-of-expenditure guidelines.
4. Libertarian Child Support: A Minimalist Approach
The libertarian perspective deviates from this uniform pattern and
offers a different approach to child support policy. Although the
libertarian perspective owes its origins to the same Lockean tradition
that produced the contractarian model, a libertarian account of
distributive justice responds to a different set of questions and has
evolved an entirely different set of answers. While the contractarian
focuses on the process by which a distribution is determined, the
libertarian looks at the means by which an individual's holdings were
obtained.s To the extent that these holdings were acquired without
violation of principles of justice, the libertarian holds that retention (or
206. The Rawlsian scenario "forces each person in the original position to take the good of
others into account." RAWLS, THEORY OF JuSTIcE, supra note 162, at 148. The utilitarian must
maximize aggregate group welfare, see supra notes 174-178, and the egalitarian must treat each
member of the group equally. See supra notes 186-190.
207. None of these theories offers a direct explanation of why a parent instead of, say, the
extended family or community, should shoulder the obligation to support a particular child. It is
theoretically possible, working within any of these traditions, to bypass the traditional nuclear family
and posit some other entity as the relevant support group. For a similar view, see Rawls, Public
Reason, supra note 32, at n.60 ("no particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or
otherwise) is required by apolitical conception of justice so long as the family is arranged to fulfill
theal tasks [of nurturing and developing citizens with a sense of justice] effectively and doesn't run
afoul of other political values."). A just society could not, of course, choose a support group
arbitrarily; perforce it would turn to the group which, at that historical moment, is believed to bear
primary responsibility for nurturing and developing its future citizens. See, e.g., MARGARET MEAD,
MALE AND FEMALE 188-91 (1949) ("When we survey all known human societies, we find
everywhere some form of the family... [but w]hich women and which children are provided for [by
which men] is entirely a matter of social arrangements.. .). See also infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing
fairness of applying community principle to separated family).
208. Influential libertarian accounts of distributive justice include JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE
Lmirrs OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975), FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, Tim




disposition as the holder sees fit) of those goods cannot violate
principles of justice.'
At first glance, the libertarian viewpoint is ill-adapted to the
problem of income allocation within a family unit. If (just) individual
acquisition creates individual entitlement, children would appear to have
no claim against their parents whatsoever. Abandonment, under this
approach, seems freely permissible.
But even the minimalist libertarian state requires its members to
refrain from harming the interests of others.21° Parents in a libertarian
state could not demand that other members of the community care for
their children any more than they could demand that the community
care for their livestock or family pet; the individual's introduction into
the community of a creature needing care creates a corresponding
obligation to ensure that the creature does not burden other community
members. Animals can, of course, be returned to nature. The infant or
young child cannot; the demands of its care thus impose obligations
upon those who have brought it into the community.
The libertarian state also enforces contracts. 1' The individual who
agrees to perform a particular act must compensate those who rely on
her promise. To the extent that one parent has relied on the support
promise of the other as a condition of bearing the child, the libertarian
state would enforce the agreement.
Applying these principles, a libertarian child support law would
intrude minimally upon the noncustodial parent's prerogatives, but
nonetheless would require support at a level which ensures that the
community is not burdened with the child's care and which is consistent
with promises that induced the child's birth. This approach yields
uncertain results, depending on how broadly community burden and
child-bearing promises are interpreted. Community burden might be
restrictively equated with public assistance costs or more broadly
interpreted to include the enormously expensive long-range
209. See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 208, at 140-41; NARVESON, supra note 208, at 94-99; NoZICK,
supra note 162, at 151.
210. This typically results from acceptance of Locke's proviso, requiring each individual to
refrain from acquisitive actions that harm others. See NARVESON, supra note 208, at 217, 239
(arguing that the libertarian agenda includes "the right that others not, in various ways, molest you"
and noting need for "network of moral and possibly legal reinforcement... for virtually any
market'); NozicK, supra note 162, at 175 (adopting Lockean proviso and noting that it "is meant to
ensure that the situation of others is not worsened").
211. See HAYEK, supra note 208, at 141 ("The whole network of rights created by contracts is
as important a part of our own protected sphere, as much the basis of our plans, as any property of
our own... The rules of property and contract are required to delimit the individual's private sphere
wherever the resources or services needed for the pursuit of his aims are scarce and must, in
consequence, be under the control of some man or another."); NARVESON, supra note 208, at 196
(noting that justice requires contract enforcement).
19981
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
consequences of childhood poverty.212  Child-bearing promises might
be confined to explicit, written agreements or interpreted more
expansively to include implied agreements derived from conventional
behavior.
D. Child Support Past and Present: The Legacy of
Locke and its Transformation
Although none of the four perspectives on distributive justice that I
have described would produce a child support principle identical to
either traditional support law or the new support guidelines, the
perspective most compatible with the law on the books is undeniably the
libertarian. This is the only perspective that assumes, as does past and
current support law, that parents are individually entitled to their
income; it is the only perspective that views child support as a taking
which demands a justification; it is the only perspective that measures
the child support obligation based on public expense and private
contractual obligation.
The justifications implicit within traditional support law also bear
more than a passing resemblance to the community and contractual
obligations that provide a basis for child support within a libertarian
state. The Poor Law tradition represented a minimal intrusion upon
parental prerogatives that was precisely tailored to reimburse the
community for care it had provided;213 the private law of child support
that emerged during the nineteenth century provided a remedy-
measured by past expenditure, from which the contract breaker's
implied promise could be inferred-to the parent victimized by a
broken marital contract.214
Traditional support law was not purely libertarian, however. It
permitted a custodial parent who had herself breached the marital
contract to obtain child support along with the victimized parent. This
212. Poor children are disproportionately likely to experience poor health, see Lorraine V.
Klerman, The Health of Poor Children: Problems and Programs, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY, supra
note 3, at 136-57, as well as abuse, neglect, and other forms of family dysfunction. See, e.g., US.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, STUDY
OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1988); Joan I.
Vondra, Childhood Poverty and Child Maltreatment, in CHILD POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY 128-39
(Judith A. Chafel ed., 1993). As adults, they have significantly higher rates of divorce, early
childbearing, reduced educational attainment, low occupational status, and welfare dependence. For
reviews of research on the immediate and long-range consequences of childhood poverty, see CHILD
POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra; CHILDREN IN POVERTY, supra note 3; Children in Poverty:
Special Issue, 65 CHILD DEv. 275-715 (1994). For discussion of the public costs associated with
childhood poverty, see, for example, HAVEMAN & WOLFE, supra note 1; NAT'L COMM'N ON
CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEw AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 2-13
(1991).
213. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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cannot be justified on the basis of an implied promise to the child
because such a promise would involve no "meeting of the minds" and
could not induce reliance.
In order to fully justify traditional support law within a libertarian
framework, one must therefore assume a duty owed by the parent di-
rectly to the child. While modem libertarians have seldom addressed
this issue,"5 their Enlightenment forebears were firmly committed to an
ethic of parental obligation. John Locke, the most important source of
libertarian property concepts, rejected absolute parental authority just as
he rejected monarchical authority: though a parent "may dispose of
his own Possessions as he pleases, when his Children are out of danger
of perishing for want," Locke held, "[t]he Nourishment and Education
of their Children, is a Charge so incumbent on Parents for their
Childrens [sic] good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of
it." '216 Nor did Locke view the child's claim as extending "only to a
bare Subsistence but [instead] to the conveniences and comforts of Life,
as far as the conditions of their Parents can afford it."2 7  Traditional
support law is thus most easily characterized as a Lockean con-
struct: while it is firmly committed to an individual entitlement ap-
proach to parental income, it is also firmly committed to the view that
parental duty is an inviolable obligation owed directly to the child and
measured by parental ability to pay.218
Current guidelines retain much of the Lockean perspective. They
presuppose a parental obligation running directly to the child,"9 assume
a parent's entitlement to his income, and base the support obligation on
parental spending patterns. They depart from Locke, however, by
favoring the parent's needs over those of the child. While Locke and
traditional support law held that the support obligation took precedence
over parental interests, guidelines providing for a self-support reserve
clearly do not. Under these formulae, even the parent whose children
burden the community through receipt of public assistance may owe no,
or token, child support if his own income falls below the statutory
"215. But see NARVESON, supra note 208, at 269-74 (refusing to condemn infanticide in societies
where there is an extreme scarcity of resources, but finding that in an affluent society such as ours
"[t]he public interest in our fellows' welfare is sufficient to justify requiring parents to take proper
and nonabusive care of their children.") l at 274.
216. LociE, supra note 160, at 311-12. See also NARVESON, supra note 208, at 310 ("So little
power does the bare act of begetting give a Man over his Issue .... that when he quits his Care... he
loses his power over them.").
217. Id. at 207.
218. For a discussion of Locke's views on parental obligation, see A. JOHN SIMMONS, TiE
LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 192-212 (1992).
219. This is perhaps most readily apparent in the cases involving conception fraud or deceit. See
infra note 282 and sources cited therein.
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personal support allowance.' Perhaps more importantly, Locke
measured the support obligation by what the parent could afford, a
child-centered metric that hints at an underlying sharing norm."
Continuity-of-expenditure guidelines, by contrast, measure support by
the extra expenses induced by the birth of a child in an intact family."
The shift is subtle, but nonetheless produces a more parent-centered
metric.
It is not surprising that traditional child support law would evidence
a Lockean perspective; Locke's ideas were extremely influential at the
time the American republic was founded and underlie many of our
social and political institutions.' Nor is it surprising that contemporary
child support law would evidence some erosion of its Lockean
foundation. Changes in social and economic conditions since the
Republic's founding have produced a variety of post-Lockean legal
developments-antitrust law, environmental regulation, income and
estate taxation-that Locke could not have envisioned and that do not
fit neatly within his world view.
What is surprising-at least at first glance-is the direction taken by
contemporary support law. Given the parental responsibility rhetoric
that accompanied the guidelines movement, it seems odd that its
primary post-Lockean innovation would be less parental responsibility;
as Locke was a founding father of the contractarian tradition as well as
libertarian property entitlement concepts, it also seems odd that the new
guidelines would be compatible only with a libertarian perspective.
Although Locke did not explicitly extend his contractarian account of
civil government to the parent-child relationship, in his view, both
parental and political authority were "for the benefit of the
Governed;"'  thus, children, "by the dependence they have on their
Parents for Subsistence, have a Right of Inheritance to their Fathers [sic]
220. Guidelines that follow the Melson approach, as well as most income-shares guidelines,
provide for a self-support reserve. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
221. For a similar view, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., The Boundaries of Care: Constructing
Community After Divorce, 31 Hous. L. REV. 425, 433 (arguing that Locke viewed "family members
[as] linked by claims and responsibilities that arise through dependence rather than simply consent").
222. See supra notes 98-100, 106-109 and accompanying text.
223. See THOMAS PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF
THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE 129-275 (1988) (describing Locke's
influence upon the founders of the American republic). But see Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 76-81 (1990) (arguing that Locke's natural rights theory of inheritance
was less influential with the republic's founders than positivistic theory of inheritance derived from
Blackstone). Some commentators have also noted a relationship between Locke's view of the
parent-child relationship and changing child-rearing patterns that emerged in the late eighteenth
century. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
CommITrNT IN AMERICAN LIFE 57-58 (1985).
224. LOCKE, supra note 160, at 210. A parent's authority over his children thus "goes along with
their Nourishment and Education, to which it is inseparably annexed." Id. at 310.
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Property, as that which belongs to them for their proper good and
behoof."' This account of child support as a fiduciary obligation
taking precedence over parental entitlement is notably absent both from
the libertarian view and current guidelines.
The new guidelines thus transform child support law's traditional
Lockean framework by placing more emphasis on parental entitlement
and less on parental responsibility. Put somewhat differently, contem-
porary support law appears to prefer Locke, the property rights liber-
tarian, to Locke, the contractarian.
E. Current Guidelines: A Failure by Any Measure
In evaluating current guidelines, it is important to keep in mind that
they are grounded in a philosophical tradition that emphasizes property
rights and individual autonomy. These aspects of the Lockean tradition
clearly retain a powerful grip on the American imagination, fueling
distrust of "big government" and a tendency to look to individual
behavior as a reason for and solution to social problems., Indeed, one
way to understand the federal child support initiatives is as an attempt to
explain and reverse a rising tide of children's poverty through the
behavior of individual "deadbeat dads." 6
The ideological roots of the child support initiatives help to
explicate the anomaly of a legislative program that is framed in terms of
parental responsibility but nonetheless elevates parental interests. The
failure of that initiative to meet its stated goals also provides an example
of how individualist rhetoric can "inhibit a broader understanding of
self and a longer-term sense of interests."'
Even within a libertarian framework, however, current guidelines
fall short. Libertarian child support would be set at a level that prevents
welfare dependence and/or poverty; support awards-like the results of
traditional child support laws-would be regressive, to the point at which
work and payment disincentives dictate otherwise.' Even the Melson
225. Id. at 210. Locke's views on children's inheritance rights have been variously interpreted.
See, e.g., PANGLE, supra note 223, at 232-33 (comparing Grotius' theory regarding inheritance to
that promulgated by Locke); SnMONS, supra note 218, at 204-12 (noting the various interpretations
of Locke's theories); JJ. Waldron, Locke's Account of Inheritance and Bequest, 19 J. HIST. PHm 39
(1981).
226. See MICHAEL P. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 237-38 (1989) (noting the "peculiarly
American tendency to transform poverty from a product of politics and economics into a matter of
individual behavior").
227. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 141-42 (1991). See also MARY A.
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIsCOuRsE 25 (1991) (arguing that
"[firom the very beginning, the absoluteness of American property rhetoric promoted illusions and
impeded clear thinking about property rights and rights in general").
228. For a discussion of how support guidelines might be modified to take these disincentives into
account, see infra notes 240-243 and accompanying text. If the child support obligor has insufficient
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formula, the only current guideline that takes poverty prevention as its
primary goal, does not meet these requirements; it provides a self-
support reserve for the child support obligor, elevating his interests
above those of the public, and fails to utilize a genuinely regressive
support schedule. 9  Continuity-of-expenditure guidelines fall short by
a wider margin. Although some do utilize regressive schedules, none
takes welfare (or poverty) prevention as a basic goal or varies the
support award to take account of the child's possible welfare
dependence. 030
Current guidelines could be "fixed" to conform to a libertarian
framework. The revised guidelines would take welfare (or poverty)
prevention as their central aim and employ regressive schedules as
necessary to effectuate that objective. Above the poverty line, the
continuity-of-expenditure approach could be retained, as the only
libertarian goal applicable at this point is the satisfaction of promises to
the other parent. Current guidelines achieve results consistent with those
obtained under traditional discretionary standards and thus would
probably meet an implied promise test.'
Within any other distributive justice framework-utilitarian,
egalitarian, contractarian-current guidelines would have to be
scrapped?12 All of these nonlibertarian approaches require a sharing
norm and yield some version of the equal outcomes model. The
income to avert welfare dependence and/or poverty, the support award should still be set at a level
equal to public expenditure in order to provide a basis for obtaining future reimbursement.
229. See supra notes 107-109, 150 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 113-116 and sources cited therein.
232. Current guidelines could, of course, be remodelled to produce results that come closer to
achieving equal outcomes. The results of current guidelines vary widely. In the Women's Legal
Defense Fund study, nine state guidelines produced awards that provided children with less than 60%
of what would be needed to achieve a living standard equal to that of the noncustodial parent while
the Connecticut, Massachusetts and District of Columbia guidelines produced awards equalling more
than 85% of what would be needed. DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 14, at 22, tbl.3-D. The
relative success of the Connecticut, Massachusetts and District of Columbia guidelines appears to
stem primarily from the fact that they rely on estimates of child-related expenditure higher than those
contained in most guidelines. See id at 43. The Massachusetts and District of Columbia guidelines
also provide a self-support reserve for the custodial parent. See id. at 54. Standards recently drafted
under the auspices of the American Law Institute urge states to adopt the Massachusetts/D.C. model
because it "better accomplishes the objectives of providing adequately for the child, avoiding
shocking disproportion between the standards of living of the child and the nonresidential parent, and
realizing the goal of fairness to the obligor when he is the lower income parent." AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.04 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 7, vol. I, June 9, 1997). The modifications that enable the
Massachusetts/District of Columbia guidelines to produce higher support awards than other continuity
-of-expenditure guidelines reduce its conceptual clarity. See PINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, supra, at § 3.04 cmt. d(iii) (noting that the model's "basic measure of child support is




individual entitlements assumption of current guidelines is so
inconsistent with this approach that revision would not be possible.
The key question, of course, is which approach we want. The fact
that current support law expresses an underlying libertarian perspective
does not tell us whether that perspective is the one most compatible with
contemporary views of parental obligation. Debate about basic goals
and values was extremely limited at the time current guidelines were
adopted; some legislatures appeared to be confused about the goals and
limitations of the continuity-of-expenditure approach; and some
policymakers explicitly preferred the policy goals of the equal
outcomes approach, rejecting it solely for practical reasons.131 The
triumph of a sharing approach in rules governing marriage also
suggests caution before we simply assume that a libertarian approach is
the right one in child support; legal rules do not always evolve smoothly
and may be "out of synch" with each other or contemporary mores for
a long while before change occurs.2M Within the area of family law, for
example, the legal requirement that one spouse demonstrate the other's
fault as a precondition to divorce was largely ignored by both courts
and litigants for decades before no-fault divorce was formally
instituted.235
It is not even clear that the choice between libertarian and sharing
goals is an either/or proposition. Libertarian child support is derived
primarily from obligations to the community and the other parent while
the sharing approach focuses on obligations arising within a family unit,
based on membership in that unit. We might conclude that child
support law should take account of both forms of obligation, mandating
sharing within the family and poverty prevention to meet parental
obligations to the community.
It is clear that change is in order. We should aim either at a
libertarian child support rule, which assumes individual parental
autonomy and restricts support to an amount which will protect society
and the justifiable expectations of the custodial parent, or at a
community approach, which treats parental income as belonging to the
family unit and seeks a just distribution among that group, or at some
combination of the two. We should not retain current guidelines, which
fail by any measure.
233. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
234. See DwoRKIN, supra note 32, at 89-90 (describing patterns of legal change).
235. For descriptions of litigant and court practices, see Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce
and the New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L REV. 1121 (1936); Note, The Administration of Divorce: A
Philadelphia Study, 101 U. PA. L REv. 1204 (1953). See also MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE
STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 63 (1972) (concluding that "consent divorce, abhorred in the




AUTONOMY OR COMMUNITY: WHAT CHILD
SUPPORT MODEL Do WE WANT?
A. Developing the Models
In order to make an informed choice between the libertarian and
community support models, we need to understand their results as well
as their goals. These results are not, of course, carved in stone. A
libertarian, autonomy-based model might focus narrowly on welfare
prevention or more broadly on poverty; a community model might seek
full equality between parent and child or a more limited equality of
basic resources. Each model's results will also be affected by the
manner in which practical problems such as work and payment
disincentives are taken into account. This section will develop two
variants of each model. Model A, the "Narrow Autonomy Model,"
takes welfare avoidance as its primary goal; Model B, the "Broad
Autonomy Model," focuses on poverty prevention; Model C, the
"Limited Community Model," aims at equality of basic resources; and
Model D, the "Full Community Model," seeks equality in living
standards.
The implementation of each model requires choices on the means
to effectuate its basic goal. For example, all of the models except A re-
quire use of a household equivalence scale to measure the comparative
circumstances (or poverty) of family members."6 Model B also requires
the selection of a poverty line,3 7 while Model C requires a decision on
the income level necessary to achieve equality of opportunity. These
implementational choices do not have standardized answers on which
every expert would agree, and the choice of an answer will affect the
child support values that the model produces.
236. For an explanation of household equivalence scales, see supra notes 135-140 and
accompanying text. A related issue each model must address is the point at which parental income
ceases to enhance the child's standard of living. Most current guidelines apply only to income below
a statutorily defined dollar value; for income above that level, a discretionary approach is utilized.
See Burt S. Barnow, Economic Studies of Expenditures on Children and Their Relationship to Child
Support Guidelines, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 16, at 18, 26. The assumption on which this
approach is based, perhaps valid, is that at high income levels additional income is unlikely to produce
direct benefits to the child. But we lack information on expenditure patterns in high income families
and thus cannot verify the assumption. See id. at 26. For contrasting examples of currnt approaches
to the high-income obligor, compare McGinley v. Herman, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Cal. App. 1996),
with Marriage of Bush, 547 N.E.2d 590 (111. App. 1989).
237. The method by which the U.S. poverty line is now calculated has been criticized on a
variety of counts. See, e.g., NAT. RES. COUNCIL, PANEL ON POVERTY AND FAMILY ASSISTANCE,
MEASURING POVERTY: A NEw APPROACH (Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995)
(describing and criticizing methodology by which U.S. poverty thresholds are calculated); Maggie
Spade, Poverty Measures Mask the Depth of Poverty in America, CLEARNINOHOUSE REV., Aug.-
Sept. 1994, at 517 (same). Some demographers argue that poverty is more accurately measured as a
percentage of median income. See, e.g., HERNANDEZ, supra note 1, at 238-41.
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Table 1 shows the results of the four models, at varying income
levels, for a one-child family in which the mother will assume sole
custody; it also shows the effect upon the initial award of remarriage
and a change in the mother's and father's income. The underlying
implementational choices upon which these results are dependent-all
subject to debate-are noted facing the table.
TABLE 1
UNADJUSTED RESULTS OF FOUR CHILD SUPPORT MODELS
FOR A ONE-CHILD FAMILY ($ PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT & % OF OBLIGOR INCOME)
BY PARENTAL INCOME
TOTALNET MONTHLY MODELA MODEL B MODEL C MODELD
INCOME FATHER'S (F) & WELFARE POVERTY LRMfIIED FULL
MOTHER'S (M NET INCOME PREVENTION* PREVENTION** EQUALrIY*** EQUALITY+
STATUS CHANGES $MO / INC.% $MO / INC.% SMO / INC.% $MO / INC.%
Case 1: $600
F $ 600; M $ 0 $300 /50% $ 600 / 100% $ 336/56% $336/56%
F's income up 20% ($720) $300 1 42% $ 720 /100% $ 403 / 56% $ 403 / 56%
M's income rises to $500 $144 / 24% $ 311 / 52% $ 116 /19% $ 116/19%
F remarries (no new income) $300/50% $ 600/ 100% $300150% $300/50%
M remarries ($600 new income) $ 144/24% $360/ 60% $ 120/20% $120/20%
Case 2: $1500
F $1000; M $500 $240/24% $311/ 31% $326/33% $340/34%
F's income up 20% ($1200) $ 288 /24% $ 311 / 26% $ 422 /35% $ 442 / 37%
M's income up 20% ($ 600) $240/24% $240/ 24% $254/25% $ 296 / 30%
F remarries ($ 500 new income) $ 240/ 16% $311/ 21% $500/ 33% $500/33%
M remarries ($I000 new income) $240124% $240/ 24% $225/23% $ 225 1237
Case 3: $3000
F $2000; M $1000 $ 480 / 24% $ 480 / 24% $ 830 / 42% $ 830 / 42%
F's income up 20% ($2400) $ 576 / 24% $ 576 / 24% $1073 / 45% $1074 / 45%
M's income up 20% ($1200) $ 480 / 24% $ 480 / 24% $ 752 / 38% $ 752 / 38%
F remarries ($1000 new income) $480/ 16% $480/ 16% $ 960/32% $960/32%
M remarries ($2000 new income) $480/24% $480/ 24% $225/ 8% $ 450 / 15%
Case 4: $5000
F $2500; M $2500 $600/24% $600/ 24% $275/ 11% $ 550 / 227
F's income up 20% ($3000) $ 642 / 24% $ 642 / 24% $ 428 / 14% $ 855 / 29%
M's income up 20% ($3000) $ 600/24% $600/ 24% $178/ 7% $ 355 / 147
F remarries ($2500 new income) $ 600 / 12% $600/ 12% $588/ 12% $1175 /24%
M remarries ($2500 newinome) $ 600/24% $600/ 24% $ 88/ 4% $ 175 / 77
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* MODEL A-A monthly public assistance grant is assumed to equal $300, based on an average
1993 AFDC grant of $373 for an average 2.9 person family. See Notebook, Welfare: Who Gets It?
How Much Does It Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at A23 (reporting data from 1994 Green
Book). Child support values in excess of a public assistance level are derived using an income shares
approach, the most common continuity-of-expenditure guideline type. For a one-child family, income
shares guidelines require a child support award ranging from 18%-24% of net income; actual child
care costs are typically added to the basic award. DODSON & ENmMACHBR, supra note 14, at 96. To
avoid consideration of child care costs, child support was calculated here at 24% of net income
instead of the midpoint of the percentage range.
** MODEL B-The poverty line is based on the 1993 U.S. poverty thresholds for nonfarm families
with a householder under age 65 ($627 per month for one individual; $811 for two; $960 for three).
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 60, at 481 tbl.746. Child support values in excess of the poverty
level are derived using an income shares approach, the most common continuity-of-expenditure
guideline. For a one-child family, income shares guidelines require a child support award ranging
from 18%-24% of net income; actual child care costs are typically added to the basic award.
DODSON & ENTMACHER, supra note 14, at 96. To avoid consideration of child care costs, child
support was calculated here at 24% of net income instead of the midpoint of the percentage range.
*** MODEL C-For families with incomes less than 150% of the 1993 U.S. poverty threshold, that
threshold was used as a basic needs standard. For families with higher incomes, the Bureau of Labor
Standards (BLS) moderate income budgets in 1993 ($1334 for one person, $2072 for two, $2915 for
three) were used. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REVISED
EQUIVALENCE SCALE FOR ESTIMATING INCOMES OR BUDGET COSTS BY FAMILY TYPE (Bulletin No.
1570-2, 1968). Child support was first calculated to achieve equal income-to-needs ratios for the
custodial and noncustodial households; income-to-needs ratios were calculated using the poverty-
level equivalence scale for lower-income families and the BLS equivalence scales for those with
incomes above 150% of the poverty line. If this support value exceeded the child's basic needs, child
support was limited to basic needs plus 50% of "excess" support. Here are two examples: 1) Case 2
is governed by the poverty threshold basic needs standard because aggregate family income is less
than 150% ($2156) of the combined poverty thresholds for a one ($627) and two-person family
($811). The poverty-level equivalence scale requires that the custodial unit receive 56% of total
family income to achieve an income-to-needs ratio equal to that of the noncustodial parent. As 56%
of total family income ($1500) equals $840, more than the $811 monthly poverty threshold for a two-
person family, child support is reduced to $311 ($811-$500 mother's income) plus (.50($340-$311)),
or $326. 2) When the mother remarries total family income rises to $2500 per month, more than
150% of the combined poverty thresholds for families of three plus one ($2380). The BLS
equivalence scale requires that 69% of total family income go to the custodial unit, producing a child
support award of $225 (.69($2500)-$1500). As this award gives the custodial household an income
($1725) less than the basic needs standard ($2915), no adjustment is necessary.
+ MODEL D-Child support was set at a value that would produce equal income-to-needs ratios for
the custodial and noncustodial household. The poverty-level equivalence scale was used to calculate
income-to-needs ratios for families with incomes less than 150% of the 1993 poverty threshold; the
BLS equivalence scale was used for higher income families.
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The results displayed in Table 1 show, first of all, just how sensitive
the models are to the assumptions used to generate a payment schedule.
For example, the initial awards generated by the autonomy and
community models are far more disparate in Case 3 than in Case 2, even
though both fathers earned two-thirds of the family's income. The
reason is simply that, because the Case 2 family is low-income, the U.S.
poverty standards were utilized to generate support awards while in
higher income Case 3, the Bureau of Labor Standards (BLS) moderate
income budgets were used. The BLS and poverty standards employ
different underlying household equivalence scales and thus produce
substantially different percentage-based outcomes." s
The table also demonstrates that each model produces payment,
work, and/or marriage disincentives. A payment disincentive is most
apparent in the case of poor parents under Model B; it is highly
unlikely that support enforcement agencies could realistically collect
100% of a parent's wages! Even Models C and D, which require
collection of more than half of the Case 1 parent's earnings, would
likely face major enforcement difficulties. 9  Depending on the public
benefits available to a single adult, enforcement might even cost the state
more money than could be gained. Models A and B also create serious
work disincentives for very poor parents, who would be required to pay
one hundred per cent of each new dollar earned until the child support
238. Household equivalence scales were generated for both the BLS and poverty threshold
income standards using a two-parent, one-child family as a baseline. By comparing the budgets
required for a one-person and two-person family with that baseline it is possible to determine the
percentage of family income needed by the divided family to maintain the same standard of living.
For example, using the poverty thresholds, a divided three-person family requires $627 + $811 per
month ($1438), while an intact three-person family requires $960; to maintain its living standard the
divided family would require 150% ($14381$960) of its former income. The noncustodial parent
requires 65.3% ($6271$960) of family income to maintain his living standard; the custodial parent and
child 84.5% ($8111$960). Equal income-to-needs ratios can be calculated by dividing the percentage
of family income each household requires to maintain its living standard by the total percentage of
family income that the entire divided family would need to maintain its living standard. Thus, to
achieve equal income-to-needs ratios, the custodial household would require 56% (84.5%1150%) of
total family income, the non-custodial household 44% (65%1150%). Using the same methodology, the
BLS income standards require that 69% of family income go to the custodial household in order to
achieve equal income-to-needs rations. Use of a different baseline or different budget may produce
substantially different results. See, e.g., DODSON & ENMIACHER, supra note 14, at 88-89 (describing
similar methodology applied to two-parent, two-child family baseline under BLS and poverty
threshold standards and reaching different results).
239. See, e.g., BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 50-51 (concluding that when fathers who
are "less willing or less able to pay ... [are] brought reluctantly into the system by reforms in the
child support enforcement program," the result may be "a decline in the proportion of awards
collected"); Judi Bartfeld & Daniel R. Meyer, Are There Really Deadbeat Dads? The Relationship
Between Ability to Pay, Enforcement, and Compliance in Nonmarital Child Support Cases, 68 Soc.
SERv. REv. 219, 230 (1994) (reporting significant inverse relationship in sample of paternity cases
between percentage of income awarded in child support and likelihood of compliance); Sandra K.
Danziger & Ann Nichols-Casebolt, Child Support in Paternity Cases, 64 Soc. SERv. REv. 458 (1990)
(same).
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award exceeds a public assistance (or poverty-level) budget. Model D
may also create serious work and/or marriage disincentives in cases
involving new income from increased earnings or marriage, as the
model sometimes requires modification of the initial support value that
taxes the income gain at more than fifty per cent.
Experts agree that high tax rates create significant negative
payment and work incentives,2 ° but unfortunately there is no consensus
on the magnitude of the effect. Using "plausible" labor supply
elasticities, economist David Betson calculated the labor supply effect of
switching from a continuity-of-expenditure child support formula to an
equal outcomes model; with a $30,000 family income, two-thirds
produced by the noncustodial parent, the net effect was a reduction in
total income of about eleven percent." Betson concluded that children
were still better off under an equal outcomes model than a continuity-
of-expenditure formula,' 2 but did not attempt to calculate the effect of
nonpayment and income concealment. Nor did he offer an optimal
formula.
For purposes of refining the models enough to roughly compare
their results, I have assumed that optimal preservation of work and
payment incentives requires an initial support rate that does not exceed
forty percent, an approximation of the current maximum income tax
rate, and a modification rate that does not exceed thirty-three percent. I
offer these numbers simply as a plausible estimates; they may well be
too high or too low. 3 Table 2 presents corrected results, relying on
these assumptions, for all four models.
240. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE LJ. 259
(1983) ("High income tax rates both create marginal disincentives to productivity and stimulate legal
and illegal noncompliance.").
241. Betson, supra note 21, at 17.
242. See id. at 18-19.
243. The suggsted maximum is consistent with the maximum rate advocated by a distinguished
English commentator. See John Eekelaar, Third Thoughts on Child Support, 24 FAM. L 99, 101
(1994), cited in Oldham, supra note 11, at 706,713 (suggesting that English maintenance requirement
child support percentage be reduced from 50% to 40% to reduce work disincentives). The maximum
modification rate is consistent with standards that formerly governed earned income retention by
AFDC recipients. As we have very little data on the relationship between child support rates and
earnings, refined estimates of optimal support rates would require substantial empirical research.
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TABLE 2
ADJUSTED RESULTS OF FOUR CHILD SUPPORT MODELS FOR A ONE-CHILD FAMILY
($ PER MONTH & % OF OBLIGOR INCOME)
BY PARENTAL INCOME LEVEL
TOTAL NET MOITILY MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODELD
INCOME: FATHER'S (F) & (WELFARE (POVERTY (TIMflD (FULL
MOTHER'S (M) NETINCOME PREVENTION) PREVENTION) EQUALITY) EQUALITY)
STATUS CHANGES $MO I INC.% SMO / INC.% $MO / INC.% $MO / INC.%
Case 1: $600
F$600;M $0 $240/40% $240/40% $240/40% $240/40%
F's income up 20% ($720) $ 280 / 32% $ 280 / 32% $ 280 / 32% $ 280 / 32%
M's income rises to $500 $ 144/24% $240/40% $ 116/ 19% $ 116/19%
F remaries (no new income) $240/40% $240/40% $240/40% $240/40%
M remarries ($600 new income) $ 144 / 24% $240/40% $ 120/20% $ 120/20%
Case 2: $1500
F $1000; M $500 $240/24% $311/31% $ 326/33% $340/34%
F's income up 20% ($1200) $ 288 / 24% $ 311 / 26% $ 392 / 33% $ 406 / 34%
M's income up 20% ($ 600) $240/24% $278/28% $293/29% $ 307/31%
F remarries ($ 500 new income) $240/16% $311/21% $491/33% $500/33%
M remarries ($1000newincome) $ 240 / 24% $ 240 / 24% $ 225 / 23% $ 225 / 237
Case 3: $3000
F $2000; M $1000 $480/24% $ 480 / 24% $ 800/40% $ 800 / 407
F's income up 20% ($2400) $ 576 / 24% $ 576 / 24% $ 932 / 39% $ 932 / 39%
M's income up 20% ($1200) $ 480 / 24% $ 480 / 24% $ 752 / 38% $ 752 / 387
F remarries ($1000 new income) $ 480 / 16% $480 / 16% $ 960/ 32% $960 / 32%
M remarries ($2000newincome) $ 480 / 24% $ 480 / 24% $140 / 7% $ 450 / 23%
Case 4: $5000
F $2500. M $2500 $600/24% $ 600 / 24% $275/11% $550122%
F's income up 20% ($3000) $ 720 / 24% $ 720 / 24% $ 428 / 14% $ 715 / 24%
M's income up 20% ($3000) $ 600/24% $ 600/24% $ 178/ 7% $ 385/ 15%
F remarries ($2500 new income) $ 600 / 12% $ 600 / 24% $ 588 / 12% $1175 / 24%
M remarries ($2500newincome) $ 600 / 24% $ 600 / 24% $ 88/ 4% $175/ 77
The results displayed in Table 2 show, first of all, that none of the
models uniformly advantage either the custodial or noncustodial
household. Because, under all of the models, the support obligation
was reduced across-the-board for poor obligors to avoid work and
payment disincentives, all of the models produce consistent awards for
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low-income families. For families in which parental income is fairly
equal, the autonomy models produce higher initial awards than the
community models. For example, in Case 4, where each parent earns
$2500 per month, both autonomy models produce awards of $600 per
month, while Model C (Limited Equality) produces an award of $275
and Model D (Full Equality), $550. In the more typical case in which
the noncustodial parent earns the larger share of family income, the
community models produce initial awards larger than those generated
by the autonomy models. Thus in Case 3, where Father earns $2000
and Mother $1000 per month, both community models produce awards
($800 per month) about 60% higher than those generated by the
autonomy models ($480 per month). But because the autonomy
models are relatively insensitive to changes in income and family
composition, the typical support obligor who earns a high percentage of
family income may fare better, over time, under a community model.
This is particularly likely when the custodial parent remarries.' The
rate of remarriage among divorced mothers is quite high, 5 and the
available evidence suggests that, on average, the living standard of this
group is as high after remarriage as it was before divorce." 6
Table 2 also shows that the community models (C and D) meet the
welfare/poverty prevention aims of the autonomy models (A and B) just
as well as the autonomy models do themselves. Put somewhat
differently, as all of the models produce approximately the same level
of welfare/poverty prevention, we do not need to decide whether
welfare/poverty prevention is an important policy goal. The choice of a
model will depend on whether we want the additional sharing that the
community models demand.
B. Contemporary Attitudes Toward Child Support
Information on public attitudes toward child support determina-
tions is available from only two public opinion polls, neither of which
244. Under current guidelines, researchers have reported that neither the father's nor the
mother's remarriage is significantly associated with postdivorce modification of the divorce
settlement. H. Elizabeth Peters et al., Enforcing Divorce Settlements: Evidence from Child Support
Compliance and Award Modifications, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 719,725 tbl.1 (1993).
245. About five-sixths of divorced men and three-quarters of divorced women remarry; about
half of remarriages take place within three years of divorce. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 29 (1981). See also Barbara F. Wilson & Sally C. Clarke, Remarriages: A
Demographic Profile, 13 J. FAM. IssuEs 123, 131 (1992). Younger women-the group most likely to
be custodial mothers-remarry, on average, more quickly than older women. See id. at 129 tbl.3
(reporting that the average period between divorce and remarriage was 1.5 years for women 20-24
and 2.5 years for women 25-29).
246. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic
Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 485 (1985).
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focused on attitudes toward child support policy goals.247 The more
detailed of the two surveys, described in two published reports, is the
1985 Wisconsin Survey of Children, Incomes, and Program Participa-
tion (CHIPPS).248 CHIPPS, which obtained responses from more than a
thousand individuals by random-digit telephone dialing, asked each re-
spondent whether the support obligation should vary based on remar-
riage, cost-of-living change, a shift in the obligor's income, and the
custodial parent's income. 249 Respondents were also presented with
three child support cases and asked to come up with appropriate child
support awards. Approximately three-quarters of the respondents indi-
cated that the value of the support obligation should vary with a shift in
either the cost-of-living or the noncustodial parent's income. About the
same percentage indicated that the support obligation should also vary
based on the value of the custodial parent's incomeY By contrast, only
36.5% reported that a noncustodial father's remarriage should affect
the support award.sl Analysis of responses to the child support cases-
where respondents were given information on the number of children,
marital status, and income of each parent-yielded consistent results; the
number of children, marital status, and income of each parent were all
significantly related to the size of the average award, as was the gender
of the respondent. 2
The other child support survey was conducted in Maryland in 1992
and produced results consistent with those reported from the CHIPPS
poll. Although response patterns again varied significantly by gender,"S
the Maryland respondents also favored a support award that varied with
cost-of-living and income shifts.'
247. See Barbara R. Bergmann & Sherry Wetchler, Child Support Awards: State Guidelines vs.
Public Opinion, 29 FAM. L.Q. 483 (1995); Thomas Corbett et al., Public Opinion About a Child
Support Assurance System, in CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS,
AND POLITICAL BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN 339 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1992); Nora
C. Schaeffer, Principles of Justice in Judgments About Child Support, 69 Soc. FORCES 157, 163
(1990). In recent years at least thirty-eight public opinion polls have investigated attitudes toward
child support. But these polls invariably focus on rating support as a public concern or gauging the
level of interest in various enforcement techniques. See Public Opinion Online (visited March 1,
1996) <http:/Iwww. >.
248. See Corbett, supra note 247, at 342-54; Schaeffer, supra note 247.
249. See Corbett, supra note 247, at 343-46; Schaeffer, supra note 247, at 163-64.
250. See Corbett, supra note 247, at 346 (reporting 74.3% of respondents favored modification
of paternal support obligation based on change in the cost of living; 73.6% favored modification
based on a change in the noncustodial father's income; 74.5% said that the paternal support obligation
should vary depending on the custiodia mother's income).
251. See id.
252. See Schaeffer, supra note 247, at 168 tbl.2. Values for each variable were generated
randomly with equal probabilities for each variable. See id. at 164.
253. See Bergman & Wetchler, supra note 247, at 490,492 tbl.5.
254. See id. at 490 tbl.4, 492 tbl.5.
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The CHIPPS and Maryland survey results do not unequivocally
support either a community or autonomy approach. The value of
awards, in both surveys, was strongly and positively linked to increases
in noncustodial parent income,"ss and, in the Maryland survey, the value
of awards was significantly higher than those called for under current
guidelines.1 6  While these results support a community methodology,
awards were not typically high enough to produce equal living stan-
dards.' Conversely, most respondents would have awarded child sup-
port even when the custodial household had a higher income than the
child support obligor251 In each survey, average award values were re-
gressive but, since the survey respondents were not given information on
poverty status or welfare dependence, it is impossible to determine
whether the tendency toward regressivity reflected an underlying
poverty-prevention goal.
Of course, we should not read too much into two surveys that did
no more than assess unexamined "knee-jerk" reactions to the problem
of child support. Because the respondents were not asked the basis for
their support awards, we can only guess at the goals and policy values
the numbers reflect. Nor can we know whether the respondents' initial
decisions would have held constant had they been asked to choose
among distributive goals and allocation methods. Extended reflection
and debate appears to change people's minds about what outcomes are
255. See Bergman & Wetchler, supra note 247, at 490 tbl.4; Schaeffer, supra note 247, at 168
tbl.2.
256. See Bergmann & Wetchler, supra note 247, at 489 tbl.2. See also Greenberg Lake: The
Analysis Group (ANLGRP), National Telephone Survey of 900 American Women (1992) (47% of
respondents indicated that "even if it means increased taxes, increas[ing] the level of child support
payments is a 'top priority' or 'very important;' 27% of respondents indicated that this goal was
'somewhat important,' 16% 'not at all important' and 11% 'don't know."').
257. In the Maryland survey, the average award was about a quarter of the obligor's income
both when the mother's income equalled the father's, and when the father made four times as much
as the mother. See Bergmann & Wetchler, supra note 247, at 489 tbl.2.
258. See Schaffer, supra note 247, at 170 (noting that 84% of respondents awarded child support
when mother earned $1500 per month, had remarried, and was supporting one child while the father
earned $1000 per month and had not remarried; awards were also made in 57% of the cases in which
the mother earned $1500 monthly and father only $500 monthly). The Maryland researchers do not
report the proportion of respondents who awarded child support when the custodial household had a
higher income, but do note that "[t]he two cases among our vignettes containing this scenario were
the only ones in which respondents on average awarded lower child support amounts than the
Maryland guidelines." Bergmann & Wetchier, supra note 247, at 491.
Continuity-of-expenditure type guidelines do not typically call for a lower award than the
presumptive amount when the custodial parent earns more than the noncustodial, but empirical,
research suggests that, at least when the low-income noncustodial parent is female, courts frequently
order no or low child support. See 1991 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 122, at 1-2 (reporting
that custodial mothers had a higher support award rate and that they received approximately one-
third more than that received by custodial fathers); J. Thomas Oldham, The Appropriate Child Support
Award when the Noncustodial Parent Earns Less than the Custodial Parent, 31 Hous. L Rav. 585,
600-04 (1994) (reviewing legal standards and empirical findings).
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just,119 and even the phrasing of the question may significantly affect the
choice made.w0
Nevertheless, some definite trends do emerge from the survey re-
suits. Respondents appeared to believe that the value of support should
not be restricted to a minimum basic needs package; that the support
obligation should be based on, and updated to take account of, the cur-
rent incomes and circumstances of family members; that the support
calculation should include a comparative element that takes into account
the circumstances of both segments of the divided family; and, finally,
that a parent should contribute something to his child's support, even if
he is worse-off than the child. Except for the respondents'" insistence
on support payment by a worse-off parent, these trends are all more
consistent with a community than an autonomy model.26' While they do
not clearly support an equal outcomes support formula, they do
strongly support an approach that treats the divided family as one fam-
ily, and which adjusts the support payment to equitably balance the
claims of all family members.
To supplement the published survey data on child support, I con-
ducted a survey on attitudes toward child support in my Fall 1997
Family Law class. The survey was conducted on the first day of class,
before students' views had been "contaminated" by any knowledge of
family law. The questionnaire indicated that its purpose was "to elicit
your personal beliefs about fairness in the determination of child sup-
port, not to test your understanding of current law or outcomes." It
directed respondents, when answering the questions, to respond "as if
you were making laws for a just 'model' society." In response to the
question, "[p]lease choose the goal you believe most important in for-
mulating a child support rule," 42% of the respondents indicated that
the child support amount should be set at a level that will "maintain the
standard of living the child enjoyed prior to parental separation;" 58%
indicated that the support amount should "equalize the living standard
of the child and his or her noncustodial parent." None of the respon-
dents indicated that child support should be set at an amount that would
259. See, e.g., NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 618-20 (1992) (reporting that justice principle
rankings and confidence ratings changed significantly after discussion behind "veil of ignorance").
260. See Richard J. Harris, Two Insights Occasioned by Attempts to Pin Down the Equity
Formula, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECrIvEs ON JusncE, supra note 35, at 32; Richard J. Harris &
Mark A. Joyce, What's Fair? It Depends on How You Phrase the Question, 38 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (1980); Roger Tourangeau et al., Belief Accessibility and Context Effects in
Attitude Measurement, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 401 (1989).
261. The only exception to this tendency appears in response to the noncustodial parent's
remarriage. This may reflect a belief that a parent's prior commitments take precedence over those
he made subsequently. Or the survey respondents may have assumed that a new spouse would also
be an income producer.
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"ensure that the child's basic needs are met," "maintain the non-
custodial parent's child-related expenditure at what it would be in an
intact family," or "ensure that the child does not burden the commu-
nity by becoming a recipient of public assistance." While a group of
law students is not a representative cross-section of the general popula-
tion 62 and answers to specific questions about "factors that a legislature
might require courts to take into account in making child support deci-
sions" indicated some ambivalence about a "pure" equal outcomes
goal,263 the respondents' complete rejection of both the continuity-of-
expenditure and autonomy-based models is nonetheless striking and
provides support for a community-based approach.
C. Evidence from Related Areas of Law
Another way of evaluating the choice between community and
autonomy is by analogy: Which approach is more consistent with other
laws governing the parent-child relationship? Which is more consistent
with the assumptions upon which family law generally relies?
1. Parental Rights and Obligations: Tradition and Trends
American law has generally followed a tradition of deference to
parental decision-making.2 4 As a result, American parents enjoy broad
discretionary powers to act against their children's interests. Parents
may, for example, curtail their children's educational opportunities265
and withhold routine medical care.2" The Supreme Court has found
262. While the students were a fairly representative group in terms of gender (50.5% were
male, 49.5% female (n--93)), 82% had never been married (n=95) and 91% had no children (n=96).
263. Some of the answers to specific questions about "factors that a legislature might require
courts to take into account in making child support decisions" were consistent with a community-
based approach (n--96). 70% of respondents indicated that "the amount a parent contributes to the
support of his or her children [should] vary depending on the income of the noncustodial parent,"
75% indicated that a parent should be required to pay child support even "when his or her income is
below the poverty line." 88% thought that the support award should be adjusted when "the cost of
living changes," 67% thought it should be adjusted if "the custodial parent remarries," and 61% if
"the custodial parent's income changes." But other responses were inconsistent. Only 48% thought
that the award should be adjusted if the noncustodial parent has other children or remarries. Only
34% thought that adjustment was in order if the noncustodial parent's income changes. The student
respondents answered the "adjustment factors" questions before selecting a primary policy goal; we
cannot tell how, if required to do so, they would have resolved the inconsistency in their answers.
264. See, e.g., 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 16, at 201 (1978) (concluding that parental rights
"may be limited or interfered with only for the most substantial, compelling, and sufficient reasons").
265. The Supreme Court has held that parental control over education is constitutionally
protected. For descriptions and criticism of the case law, see Suzanna Sherry, Responsible
Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CmI. L REv. 131, 160-61, 171-72 (1995); Richard J.
Ameson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A Critique of Wisconsin v.
Yoder, in POLITICAL ORDER: XXXVIII Nomos 365 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds.,-1996).
266. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L REv. 1371, 1382, 1396-1405 (1994) (describing and
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parental rights to be of sufficient importance to deserve constitutional
protection; it has held that the state may not overrule a parent's child-
rearing decision unless the child's health or safety is threatened. 267 This
tradition of deference to parental decision making is, of course, highly
compatible with the minimalist, parent-centered approach that underlies
traditional support law and the autonomy-focused support models.
Both focus on parental entitlement rather than the children's needs.
While the tradition of deference to parents is still strong, for at least
the past two centuries it has been on the decline. Two hundred years
ago, a parent could indenture his child to whom and on whatever terms
he pleased;"6  he could offer his child as much-or as little-education
as he wished; and, given the lack of laws prohibiting child abuse, his
disciplinary powers were virtually unlimited.269  By the late nineteenth
century, parental authority had been circumscribed by laws dealing with
child labor, education, and neglect,27 and the last three decades have
witnessed a wave of new limitations on parental prerogatives. Child
abuse laws have been strengthened271 and parent-child immunity, which
historically protected the parent against a damages claim by the child, is
now alive in only a minority of jurisdictions.22 Within the past two
decades, the Supreme Court has also ruled that parents may not veto a
criticizing case law); Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions
Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 311, 312-14 (same).
267. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("This primary role of the parents in the
upbring of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.");
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982) (holding that state must support petition to terminate
parental rights with clear and convincing evidence).
268. See MASON, supra note 44, at 31-39.
269. See JUDrrH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1165-66 (3d ed. 1992)
(noting that "[s]tate sponsored schools were the first serious intrusion into the right of parents to rear
their own children" and summarizing shift to mandatory education); tenBroek, supra note 39, at 288,
292-94.
270. The most thorough account of these shifts, utilizing a variety of original sources, is
contained in CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Robert H. Bremner
ed., 1970). See also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBROD, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 916-21, 926-36 (3d ed. 1995)
(summarizing development of compulsory education and child labor laws).
271. See CLARK, SECOND EDrrION, supra note 44, at 595-602 (noting that child abuse "has only
been impressed upon public consciousness in the years since World War I" and describing
development and functioning of child abuse reporting acts and registries); ALFRED KADUSHIN &
JUDITH A. MARTIN, CHILD WELFARE SERvicEs 223-25 (4th ed. 1988) (noting that "the late 1960s
and the 1970s showed an almost explosive growth of interest in the problem of the child requiring
protection, with an emphasis on child abuse" and describing creation of U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Children and Youth in 1971 and enactment of federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of
1974). See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L REv. 2401,
2435 (1995) (noting that "public concern about child abuse and neglect has increased in the past
generation").
272. See Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 n.4 (Ohio St. 1982) (citing cases
from 28 states which have abolished parent-child immunity in whole or in part). See also Annot., 6
A.L.R. 4th 1066, 1113-14 (1981).
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mature minor's reproductive decisions,273 and that a parent's entitlement
to commit his child to a mental institution is not absolute. 4  In sum,
deference to parental authority has reached an historic low. 5
The decline in parental authority has been accompanied by a shift
in rhetoric. Recent commentators on parental rights may disagree about
the scope and content of parental authority, but they are virtually
unanimous in the view that parental rights derive from, and are limited
by, the child's needs? 6 This child-centered perspective on parents'
rights has produced an altered account of parenthood as a functional
status, rather than one derived from biology or legal entitlement.?7  The
new perspective has increasingly led courts to limit the rights of parents
who have failed to accept parental responsibilities and to grant
"parental" rights to nonparents.2 7 It has also produced a shift in
litigation involving children. While the traditional, parent-focused
perspective viewed the child as the subject of the proceeding, the new
child-centered perspective views the child as a rights-bearing party
entitled to legal representation.279
273. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74-75 (1976); Beilotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion).
274. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
275. For a detailed discussion of family law's evolution in the direction of a more explicit linkage
between parental rights and responsibilities, see Scott & Scott, supra note 271, at 2453-76.
276. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ. 293, 294-95
(1988); John Bigelow et al., ParentalAutonomy, 5 J. APPLIED PHIL. 183 (1988); Dwyer, supra note
266, at 1374; Scott & Scott, supra note 271, at 2430-31; Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1748-49 (1993);
Vallentyne & Lipson, supra note 27. But see FRIED, supra note 162, at 152 ("the right to form one's
child's values, one's child's life plan and the right to lavish attention on that child are extensions of
the basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things for oneself... the child is regarded as an
extension of the self").
277. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA
L REv. 637 (1993); John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"?: The Claims of Biology as
the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 363 (1991); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M.
Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody
Disputes, 27 EMORY LJ. 209,243-43 (1978); Nancy D. Polikoff, This ChildDoes Have Tvo Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional
Families, 78 Gao. L.J. 459 (1990); Note, Looking For a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the
Functional Approch to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L REV. 1640 (1991). See also
Vallentyne & Lipson, supra note 27.
278. See, e.g., IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 600-04 (2d ed.
1991) (summarizing cases, statutes and scholarly commentary).
279. The U.S. Department of Justice has issued standards which provide that a child should have
independent legal counsel "in any proceeding at which the custody, detention, or treatment of the
juvenile is at issue." NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
§ 3.132, at 273 (1980). While most states have not gone this far in providing children with legal
counsel, the provision of counsel is on the increase and most of the scholarly commentary is
favorable. See, e.g., Tad Eitzen, A Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody
Dispute, 19 FAM. LQ. 53, 61-64 (1985); Monroe laker & Charlotte Perretta, A Child's Right to
Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 108, 116-19 (1971); George H. Russ, "Gregory K. ": A Child's
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These various manifestations of a child-centered approach to
parental rights support a community-based support model more than an
autonomy-based one. But the child-centered perspective also represents
only a trend, not a consistent, established tradition." °
2. Economic Entitlements Based on Family Membership: Can
Inconsistent Rules Be Justified?
Community is clearly the emerging norm in rules governing
marriage. Does logic mandate a similar approach to the parent-child
relationship or can an inconsistent approach be justified?
At first glance, the differences between marriage and. parenting
stand out more than the similarities. The oft-cited basis for a
community model of marriage is the evolution of marriage toward a
"partnership of equals" norm. But parents and children are neither
relational equals nor partners who have chosen each other in an arms-
length transaction.
While marriage involves two adults who can act as equals in a
relationship of mutuality, the child's lesser age and experience ensure
that parents will set the tone of the relationship. Parents will dominate
family decision making, work, and income production. Parent and
child may be equally important to each other, but they are not, and
cannot be, relational equals.
Modem marriage relationships also derive from choice, and thus
can be described as partnerships or contracts; the relationships of
parents and children cannot. No child chooses her parents, and only a
small number of adoptive parents choose their child. While marriage
partners can freely decide whether and when to marry, many parents
have children by accident rather than by design. Both parents can, by
joint surrender of the child to an adoption agency, refuse to enter a
parental relationship, but one parent acting alone cannot.?" Even a clear
case of deception is insufficient to avoid parental obligation.22 Nor can
Right to Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 378-80 (1993). See also Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the
Kid! Toward a Rule of Children's Choice in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L REV. 299 (1994)
(arguing that determination of custodial parent should be based exclusively on child's choice if child
is more than six years of age).
280. See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REv. 267, 295
(1995) (detailing varied reasons for repeated failure of initiatives on behalf of children); Scott &
Scott, supra note 271, at 2473 (noting "uneasy coexistence of legal outcomes that largely fit within a
fiduciary framework together with legal rhetoric that continues to emphasize parental rights without
responsibility").
281. Some states make an exception in the case of a nonmarital child whose mother consents to
his adoption shortly after the birth.
282. See, e.g., John J. Sampson, Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Child Support: A Comment
on in re Pamela P., in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION, supra note 84, at 69 (describing
cases and limits of contract approach to child support).
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a child legally terminate a parental tie.2s3 Thus the partnership or
contract metaphor that we apply to marriage-and to which the
community conception of marriage is so often linked-does not appear
to apply to parenting.?"
While inequality and lack of choice factually distinguish the
parent-child relationship from that of a married couple, these
differences do not necessarily justify departure from the community
ideal now applicable to marriage. The roots of parent-child inequality
lie in the child's dependence, which is itself the source of both the
parental support obligation and the parental altruism norm.85 Parent-
child inequality could thus justify a legal regime requiring more sharing
behavior toward a child than toward a marital partner, but not one that
requires less. Moreover, while the community conception of marriage is
typically linked with the idea of contract or partnership, it is in no way
dependent on the existence of such an agreement. The marriage
contract is a status contract, with terms that are largely determined by
legislatures rather than by the individual marriage partners themselves.2 16
These terms have varied enormously over the centuries and across
societies; more modest variation is evident even from one state to the
283. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App, 1993). For an argument that
they should be able to do so, see Russ, supra note 279, at 392.
284. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 145, at 131 (noting that rules that require sharing of
property by marital partners "[s]ometimes ... are thought of an as an expression of the presumed
intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share and share alike");
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 72, at 484 (reporting that, under marital-sharing theory,
"economic rights of each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken marital bargain under which
the partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits of the marriage"); ROBERT E
GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 72
(1985) (noting that "[the received view of marriage is insistently contractual"). The application of
contract principles to marriage reflects a broader legal trend:
Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in modem American law. In fields
ranging from corporations and partnership, to landlord and tenant, to servitudes, to the law
of marriage, scholars have come to understand our legal rules as resting mainly on imputed
bargains that are susceptible to alteration by actual bargains.
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995).
285. This is the traditional as well as modem view. Compare LOCKE, supra note 160, at I.vi.56;
ll.vi.63, and I BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 447-53, with sources cited in supra note 162.
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (1981) ("Although marriage is
sometimes loosely referred to as a 'contract,' the marital relationship has not been regarded by
common law as contractual in the usual sense. Many terms of the relationship are seen as largely
fixed by the state and beyond the power of the parties to modify." A promise by a person
contemplating marriage or by a married person is "unenforceable if it changes an essential incident
of marriage such as "the duty imposed by law on one spouse to support the other...."). See also
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 163 (T.M. Knox ed. & trans., 1967) (1821) (arguing that the point
of marriage is to "transcend the standpoint of contract" in favor of an attitude of "love, trust and the
common sharing of their entire existence").
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next.287 The community conception of marriage thus ultimately derives
from social values, not from spousal equality or choice.288
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the community conception of
marriage is new and still grounded more in aspiration than reality.
Researchers report that, despite current egalitarian ideology, the typical
American husband continues to have more power within marriage than
his wife. 2 9 Husbands are more likely to dominate spending decisions;2
they are less likely, even when the wife works full-time outside the
home, to perform house work or child care.29'
A comparison of marriage and parenting thus should focus neither
on the extent of equality and choice present in each relationship nor on
how these relationships are actually lived.2  It must concentrate instead
on the values and goals contemporary American society sets for each.
Do we expect parents to share with their children to the same extent as a
spouse, or to a lesser extent?
The evidence on current sharing expectations is, unfortunately, less
plentiful than we would like. Public opinion surveys do show that the
287. Marital property law, where the rules vary substantially depending on whether the state
follows community or common law principles, is a good example. See supra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text.
288. For similar views, see GooDIN, supra note 284, at 75 ("Why we insist upon... particular
duties being written into the '[marriage] contract' ... has nothing to do with the values of contract or
self-assumed obligations. Our insistence is grounded instead in ... what lawyers loosely dub 'public
policy."'); Regan, supra note 221, at 435-41 (arguing that marital duties are based on "role morality"
rather than contract). See also June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L REv. 953, 1002-03 (1991) (critiquing
partnership model of marriage and noting that it "embraces the existing justifications for expanded
property divisions and spousal support while eschewing any effort to achieve precise calculations").
289. See, e.g., PILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMIEICAN COUPLES 53-59 (1983)
(reporting that surveyed husbands were more likely to dominate their marriage than were surveyed
wives and attributing this tendency to income inequality and "adherence to the male-provider
philosophy"). See also JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 169 (1989) (reporting that English
husbands' greater earning power "continues to be associated with greater control over finances and
greater power in decision making').
290. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 289, at 62-64; PAHL, supra note 289, at 169;
Carole B. Burgoyne & Alan Lewis, Distributive Justice in Marriage: Equality or Equity?, 4 J.
COMMUNITY & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 101, 101 (1994) (reporting results of research showing that
"inequality between spouses is still commonplace, with the husband more likely to have overall
financial control and greater access to money for personal spending"). See also MAVIS MACLEAN,
SURVIVING DIVORCE: WoMEN's RESOURCES AFTER SEPARATION 21-22 (1991) (summarizing
several research reports).
291. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 289, at 144-46 (reporting survey data and
concluding that "working wives still bear almost all the responsibility for housework"); ARLIE
HOCHSCHiLD, THE SECOND SHiFr 216-22, 259-62 (1989) (reporting that only 18% of surveyed
husbands were as actively involved in the home as their wives and that men earning less than their
wives were the least likely to participate in housework). But see FRANCES K GOLDSCHEIDER &
LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAmILES, No FAMILIES? 187 (1991) (reporting that household task sharing by
both husbands and children "increases significantly as the wife's earnings rise").
292. See, e.g., GOODIN, supra note 284, at 92 ("the model of voluntarily self-assumed
responsibilities has little place in the analysis of special familial responsibilities").
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average American wants to leave all of his property to his spouse, with
nothing to his children, 29s but most commentators attribute this trend to
changes in life expectancy, residence, and the timing of intergenera-
tional wealth transmission rather than a change in popular sentiment
regarding family sharing.294 Opinion surveys also show that fewer par-
ents are now willing to maintain a marriage for the sake of the children
than were parents a generation ago,295 but it is unclear whether this shift
in opinion has resulted from a greater tendency to elevate adult interests
over those of children or from a different appraisal of the risks of di-
vorce.
29 6
Perhaps the best evidence on sharing expectations comes from
research on beliefs about distributive justice. Jennifer Hochschild, who
studied American attitudes toward distributive justice in a wide range of
institutions, has reported that within the nuclear family "strict equality
and need predominate" as norms to which individuals profess
allegiance.297 While parents often "leaven [their] focus on equality with
discipline,"298 they also believe that "[all family] members deserve
equal amounts of the good being divided" and should "sacrifice equal
amounts of satisfaction when necessary."'
293. See, e.g., Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. FOUND. RES. . 319, 348-64; John R.
Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L REV.
277 (1975); Comment, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of
the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IoWA L REV. 1041, 1078-1100 (1978). Earlier studies are
cited in these publications. A strong preference for the surviving spouse has also been reported in
England. See U.K. LAW COMM'N, FAMILY LAW: DisIUoN ON INTsTAcy app. C, 36-37, 40-45
(1989).
294. See, e.g., CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMEIuCA FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 158-62, 204-13 (1987); John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in
Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MIcH. L REV. 722 (1988). Intergenerational transfers continue to
be an important source of wealth. See William G. Gale & John K. Scholz, Intergenerational
Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 152 tbl.4 (1994) (estimating that
intergenerational transfers, including bequests, college expense payments, and other intended lifetime
transfers, accounted for more than 60% of aggregate U.S. net worth in 1986); Edward N. Wolff,
Changing Inequality of Wealth, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 552, 557 (1992) (arguing that large inter vivos
gifts are a major factor in wealth inequality).
295. See Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States, 51 .
MARRIAGE & FAM. 873, 880 thl.3 (1989) (reporting that approximately half of a sample of young
mothers said that couples should stay together even if they could not get along in 1962, while less than
20% did so in 1985).
296. Older studies of the impact of divorce on children also tend to yield larger differences
between children from divorced and nondivorced families than more recent ones. One explanation
for this trend is simply that divorce has become more common. See, e.g., Paul R. Amato & Bruce
Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children: A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 26
(1991).
297. JENNIFER L HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE
JusIcE 107 (1981).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 52.
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There is also evidence that the typical parent-child relationship has
become more egalitarian." ° Popular sentiment no longer favors corpo-
ral punishment of children, and childhood deference to parents, along
with other authority figures, has declined.301 One commentator has gone
so far as to suggest the "decline of childhood and a corresponding
diminution in the character of adulthood. ''3°2 This assessment is based
on recent evidence from popular culture: films and television pro-
gramming in which children behave like small adults and adults like
small children, the merging of juvenile and adult styles, tastes, and rec-
reational pursuits, and the increase in adult activities (sexual, criminal,
substance abusive) by children °. 33 But as early as the 1950s, sociologists
had begun to note the rise of an adolescent social order "in which kids
look to other kids as much as to their parents for habits, values, and as-
pirations."3" Evidence also suggests that "[contemporary] parents be-
lieve that they must listen carefully and at all times to their children,
even that they can learn from their children-ideas which would have
seemed quite preposterous just a few generations ago." 305
Like the trend toward a child-centered approach to parents' rights,
these various manifestations of less hierarchical relationships between
parents and children support a community support model more than
they do an autonomy-based approach. The autonomy model relies on
a "Father Knows Best" conception of the family in which parental
rights go hand-in-hand with the assumption that parents will know, and
act on, their children's best interests. By contrast, the community
300. The trend toward egalitarianism between parent and child may be longstanding and may
have been accelerated by the rise in single parenting. See, e.g., RANDOLPH TRUMBACH, THE RISE
OF THE EGALITARIAN FAMILY (1978); Robert S. Weiss, Growing Up a Little Faster: The Experience
of Growing Up in a Single-Parent Household, 35 J. Soc. Issuas 97 (1979) (reporting tendency by
custodial mothers to treat older daughters as confidantes). There is also evidence suggesting that the
trend affects a parent and child's relationship, but not responsibilities; researchers report that today's
children are much less likely to share in household chores than were children in earlier generations.
GOLDSCHEIDER & WAITE, supra note 291, at 167-71.
301. See, e.g., Clare Collins, Spanking Is Becoming the New Don't, N.Y. TIMES, May II, 1995, at
C8 (reporting survey research showing lower spanking rate among younger parents and decline in
overall support for spanking from 94% approval rate in 1968 to 68% in 1994); Celia W. Dugger, A
Cultural Reluctance to Spare the Rod, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at B1 (reporting anecdotal evidence
of less approval and use of corporal punishment by native-born Americans than by immigrants).
302. NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 134 (1982).
303. See id. at 98-142.
304. FRANCLIN E. ZI RING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 44 (1982). See
also JAMES S. COLEMAN, THE ADOLESCENT SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE TEENAGER AND ITS
IMPACT ON EDUCATION (1961); JOHN R. SEELEY ET AL., CRESTWOOD HEIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE
CULTURE OF SUBURBAN LIFE (1956).
305. DEMos, supra note 57, at 24, 37. See also Duane F. Alwin, From Obedience to Autonomy:
Changes in Traits Desired in Children, 1924-1978, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 33 (1988) (reporting trend
toward parental preference for children's independence instead of obedience).
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model-like the egalitarian family-assumes neither parental wisdom
nor altruism; parents are expected to share, no more and no less.
D. Applying the Community Principle to Child Support:
Problems and Prospects
So far, we have seen that the community support models meet
public policy goals better than does the autonomy approach. The
community models satisfy the poverty prevention aims of the autonomy
approach as well as the autonomy approach itself. They do a much
better job of increasing support awards, the policy goal that motivated
the guidelines movement in the first place. Based on the sparse
evidence available, the community models more closely match public
opinion trends. Finally, they appear to comport with evolving family
law and cultural norms better than does the autonomy approach. These
various advantages all argue strongly in favor of a community-based
support policy.
1. Community vs. Clean Break
A community approach would apply to the parent-child
relationship differently than it does to the husband-wife relationship, a
difference that may negatively affect its political acceptability. With
marriage partners, the community approach demands equal sharing
only at the time the relationship terminates; although an aggrieved
spouse may seek the imposition of a constructive trust to prevent the
dissipation of marital assets, division takes place at divorce or death.
While case law is sparse, courts have been extremely loathe to interfere
with actual spending patterns in an intact marriage." The rhetoric of
community emphasizes the commitments made during marriage, but the
application of a community approach focuses on the severance of those
commitments. The result is that the community approach, applied to
marriage, is entirely consistent with the current view of divorce as a
"clean" relational break.m
By contrast, the child support obligation arises when parent and
child live physically apart in an intact legal relationship; a
306. See, e.g., CLARK, SECOND EDITION, supra note 44, at 256-57. For criticism of such
reluctance, see, for example, Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The
Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. LJ. 558, 565-67 (1974);
Monrad G. Paulsen. Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REV. 709, 719
(1956).
307. See, e.g., LEsLiE J. HARRIs ET AL., FAMILY LAW 318-19 (1996) (describing association
between no-fault divorce and the view that "judicial decrees should end, as far as possible, all
personal and economic ties between the spouses" as well as implications of this view regarding post-
divorce support obligations); Scott, supra note 205, at 704 ("A 'clean break' policy pervades the post-
[no fault] reform legal regime.").
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"winding-up," like that which occurs at divorce or spousal death, is
inappropriate. In this context, the community principle would apply to
income, not property; sharing would take place over time, not all at
once; the emphasis would be on relational continuity, not severance.
The result is conflict with the current ideal of divorce as a clean
relational break; the community models of child support assume that
both parents will remain part of one family."'
This aspect of the community models, which runs counter to a deep
current in contemporary culture, will almost certainly ensure opposition
to its adoption. Couples who divorce typically want a clean break and,
for the growing population of never-married parents, there will seldom
be an ongoing familial relationship to continue. Indeed, legislative
rejection of the equal outcomes approach during the period when
guidelines were first adopted may have stemmed more from opposition
to this emphasis on relational continuity than the "hidden alimony"
issue identified by commentators; all child support models benefit the
custodial parent, but not all treat that parent as an ongoing member of
the support obligor's family.
While the tension between the community principle and clean
break philosophy is an undeniable political disadvantage, it is not, in my
view, a disadvantage on the merits. Although the desire for a clean
break from a former spouse is understandable, the attainment of that
aim requires abandonment of parental commitments.3 9 The parent who
maintains a relationship with his child must maintain a relationship with
the child's other parent. Visits and vacations must be planned;
decisions about the child's education and medical care must be made.
Nor can one parent always avoid the other at the school play, the Little
League game, or the hospital bedside. Even when support obligations
have terminated as a result of the child's maturity, parents will-or
should-share graduation ceremonies, weddings, and grandchildren.
Noncustodial parents do not, of course, always maintain their
parental commitments; researchers report that as many as half of
children with nonresidential fathers have not seen them during the past
year. 10 But this is hardly a pattern that public policy should encourage.
308. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property
Rhetoric, 82 GEo. LJ. 2303, 2307 (1994) ("At least part of the financial difficulty that divorce
produces for women and children reflects our inability to move beyond the dichotomy of spouses and
strangers in thinking about the relationship between former spouses after divorce.")
309. For a similar view, see Regan, supra note 221, at 442 (arguing that "adult decisions about
family life cannot be compartmentalized into those relating to marriage and those relating to
parenthood; decisions about marital obligations effectively are decisions about parental obligations as
well").
310. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREw J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT
HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 35 (1991) (reporting data from 1981 National Survey
of Children showing that "close to half' of children had not visited with their fathers in past 12
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There is now a large body of research showing that children with an
absent parent experience more problems as children and fewer successes
as adults than their counterparts in intact families. The lower incomes
of single-parent households appear to be the most important factor in
producing these differences, 1' but there is reason to believe that lower
quality parent-child relationships, resulting from parental conflict, stress
and absence, also play a role."2 There is also evidence that visiting and
paying child support are complementary activities. 3
As a number of commentators have emphasized, the "clean break
philosophy may undermine parental commitment"31 4  and thus
contribute to the tendency of noncustodial parents to ignore parental
obligations. In part because of this possibility, a number of state
legislatures have recently considered reintroducing limits on the
availability of no-fault divorce.1 5  While experts remain skeptical that
changes in divorce grounds would appreciably affect either the divorce
months). See also Judith A. Seltzer & Susan M. Bianchi, Children's Contact with Absent Parents, 50 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 663, 670 tbl.3 (1988) (revealing that among children living with their mother,
35% never see their father, and an additional 24% see him less than once a month); Frank L. Mott,
When Is a Father Really Gone?: Paternal-Child Contact in Father-Absent Homes, 4 DEMOGRAPHY
499 (1990) (noting that 27% of noncustodial fathers visit their child once a year and 7% have never
visited their child). But see MACCOBY & MNOOIN, supra note 117, at 176 tbl.8.2 (showing that, in
California divorce sample three years post-divorce, 63.9% of children living with mother saw father
within the last month).
311. See supra notes 3-4 and sources cited therein.
312. See, e.g., McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 4, at 95-115 (reviewing evidence);
McLanahan, Intergenerational Consequences, supra note 3, at 305-06 (concluding that the "most
important loss that comes with divorce.., is economic insecurity and income deprivation" and noting
that "there are good theoretical reasons for believing that [divorce] reduces the quantity and quality
of parental investment, which in turn reduces the children's well-being").
313. See, e.g., Judith A. Seltzer et al., Family Ties After Divorce: The Relationship Between
Visiting and Paying Child Support, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1013, 1027 (1989) (finding that
"noncustodial parents who visit their children more frequently also pay more child support"); Sara S.
McLanahan et al., Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater Security or Greater
Conflict?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra note 109, at 239, 248-49. McLanahan
found that child support payment was significantly and positively linked both with less parental
conflict and more noncustodial parent contact for adolescent children born to married parents; it was
significantly and positively linked to more noncustodial parent contact for all children born to married
parents. See id. For children born to unmarried parents, child support payment was significantly and
negatively associated with less parental conflict; it was significantly and positively associated with
noncustodial parent contact conflict. See id.
314. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L REv.
9, 36 (1990) (arguing that the clean break model of the spousal relationship may undermine parental
willingness to continue to contribute to the financial support of children post-divorce). See also
FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 310, at 118 ("For many men... marriage and parenthood are
a package deal. Their ties to their children, and their feelings of responsibility for their children,
depend on their ties to their wives.... [I]f the marriage breaks up, the ... ties between fathers and
children also are broken."); GLENDON, supra note 145, at 235 ("[t]he idea of making a clean break is
wholly unrealistic in those cases where minor children are present").
315. See David Whitman, The Divorce Dilemma, U.S. NEws& WORLD REP., Sept. 30, 1996. at
58; Bill to End No-Fault Divorce in Florida Would Make it Harder to Break Up, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 29,
1996, at 19.
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rate or parental behavior, as a society interested in the success of the
next generation we certainly have every reason for fostering parental
commitment rather than a clean break. Of course, the adoption of a
community child support model is no more likely to reduce the divorce
rate or dramatically affect parental behavior than are altered divorce
grounds, but such a model might nonetheless help to foster parental
commitment at the margins by recognizing the divided family as one
family-the child's family.316 And it at least offers a legal regime based
on our brightest hopes for parents rather than our worst fears.
317
2. Community vs. the Reality of Separation
The fact that the child support obligation arises in the context of a
disrupted relationship offering neither parent nor child the
opportunities for noneconomic sharing available in an intact family
raises a more fundamental issue: Is it fair to treat parent and child as an
ongoing familial community when they lack the opportunities for day-
to-day intimacy and sharing offered by a residential relationship, and
may never have had such opportunities?3 8 The issue is presented most
starkly in the case of nonmarital childbearing, where the noncustodial
parent may never have had a residential relationship with the child or
even the other parent. 9
In looking at this question, it is important to keep in mind that a
community child support model does not uniformly disadvantage non-
custodial parents as compared to an autonomy-based approach. Non-
custodial parents who earn a relatively high percentage of family
income will initially pay more support under a community approach,
but the noncustodial parent whose former spouse remarries, 320 whose
own income declines, 321 or who has additional children-situational
316. See CH RLIN, supra note 245, at 85 (noting that after divorce "mother, father, and children
all may have a different conception of who is in their immediate family" and that "one can no longer
define 'the family' . . . except in relation to a particular person").
317. For similar perspectives, see Bartlett, supra note 276, at 294 (arguing that family law should
"reinforce parental dispositions toward generosity and other directedness," not "possessiveness and
self-centeredness"); Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 Wls. L REv. 819, 894 (arguing that "belonging is essential to becoming" and
that family law should avoid obstacles to affiliation).
318. Some commentators have argued that even current support laws may demand too much of
an absent parent who lacks day-to-day contact with his child. See David L. Chambers, The Coming
Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L REv. 1614, 1632 (1982); Krause, supra note
62, at 181.
319. See sources cited supra note 145.
320. See sources cited supra notes 245-246.
321. One group of researchers has reported that, among all variables considered, modification
of the original child support award was most likely to be associated with loss of the father's
employment. H. Elizabeth Peters et al., Enforcing Divorce Settlements: Evidence from Child Support
Compliance and Award Modifications, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 719,725 tbl.1 (1993).
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shifts to which the autonomy-focused models are insensitive and that
today produce cries of unfairness from noncustodial parents-will over
time fare better under a community model than under an autonomy-
focused approach."z The community model also places the noncus-
todial parent on a footing equal to that of his child and former spouse;
he is not expected to shoulder a significant child support burden when
they are better off than he is.
Nor is the community model, when applied to marriage, restricted
to those relationships that have in fact provided intimacy and sharing.
The couple whose marriage is marked by distrust, withholding, violence,
or even prolonged separation is treated as a community just as is the
couple whose relationship involves genuine mutuality. It is the fact of
marriage, not its quality, that has triggered the community standard.
The law has looked to the existence of, rather than the
circumstances surrounding, the marriage both to avoid difficult fault
judgments and to emphasize the centrality of marital status as the basis
for application of the community principle. There are strong reasons
for applying this status-oriented approach to the parent-child
relationship as well. First, the parent-child relationship may well be, in
our mobile and divorce-prone society, the most permanent of ties.',
For both parent and child, the relationship is unique and, in many cases,
irreplaceable. 24 Parent and child will have only one opportunity to
experience this relationship; for the child, there may be no other
opportunity to relate to a parent-figure of this gender. The quality of
the relationship and the range of parental substitutes also lie entirely
outside the child's control.
While the child's options for replacing a parent are fewer than
those of a spouse who is dissatisfied with a marriage partner, the
relationship is of even greater importance. A wealth of data, from
diverse sources and theoretical schools, uniformly demonstrates the
centrality of the parent-child relationship as a determinant of the child's
personality, resilience, and relationships with others."as Decades of
322. See supra Tables 1 and 2, and accompanying text.
323. See MARCIA MILLMAN, VARM HEARTS AND COLD CASH: THE INTIMATE DYNAMICS OF
FAMILIES AND MONEY 147-48 (1991) (noting that "[o]ne reason why children have become so
important as a source of love is that, increasingly, they are the only permanent love relations people
have in this society" and quoting a twice-divorced man as concluding that "[if you want to have a
lasting relationship, have children").
324. For some parents and children, support eligibility is also temporary. One pair of
demographers estimates that "almost one-third of children who were ever eligible [for child support]
experience the reunion of their biological parents within four years of parental separation." Nazli
Baydar & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, The Dynamics of Child Support and Its Consequences for Children, in
CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra note 109, at 257, 280 (1994).
325. For representative examples of the literature, see JOHN BOWLIY, A SECURE BASE:
PARENT-CHILD ATTACHMENT AND THE HEALTHY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1988); CLINICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ATTACHMENT (Jay Belsky & Teresa Nezworski eds., 1988); MARGARET S.
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research have also established that a child's ties to his parents do not
lose their importance simply as a result of separation or loss of day-to-
day contact.326 "iT]he parent-child tie ... can be greatly distorted [but
it] is not to be expunged by mere physical separation."3 27 Not even the
availability of a parental substitute, for example a stepparent, renders the
absent parent unimportant.328 The absent parent remains important to
the child because that parent is a primary source of the child's identity
and self-esteem, 329 as well as her history and unique biological
inheritance. Even children adopted at birth sometimes go to
extraordinary lengths to obtain information about their origins, family
history, and the reasons for their relinquishment.33°
Finally, to restrict application of the community principle to cases
in which the parent-child relationship closely approximates that of a
harmonious intact family-one with a successful joint custody
arrangement, for example-would reward the wrong kind of parental
behavior. Although some commentators have speculated that the
increased incidence of "casual" parenting may produce a more limited
MAHLER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT (1975); SCIENTIFIC
FOUNDATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHIARTRY (Michael C. Rutter ed., 1980); Glen H. Elder, Jr.
et al., Problem Behavior and Family Relationships: Life Course and Intergenerational Themes, in
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIFE COURSE: MULTIDSCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 293 (Aage B.
Sorensen et al. eds., 1986); Seymour Epstein, The Self-Concept: a Review of the Proposal of an
Integrated Theory of Personality, in PERSONALITY: BASIC ISSUES AND CURRENT RESEARCH 81 (Ervin
Staub ed., 1980).
326. For descriptions of the research findings, see MICHAEL C. RUTTER, MATERNAL
DEPRIVATION REASSESSED (2d ed. 1981); Peggy C. Davis, The Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever
Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557,563-72 (1983-84); Garrison, supra note 41,
at 455-60; see also Penny Ruff Johnson et al., Family Foster Care Placement: The Child's
Perspective, 24 CHILD WELFARE 959, 963, 967 (1995) (reporting that all but 3 of 95 children aged
11-14 who had been in foster care for between 6 months and 2 years indicated that they missed their
families and that 56% reported "they miss their parents most of the time").
327. JOHN BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 114 (1951). See also JUDITH
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A
DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 234 (1989) ("Children do not dismiss... [a parent] just because there has
been a divorce .... [That parent remains a] part of the child's emotional life, a factor in the child's
self-esteem, self-image, aspirations, and relationships with the opposite sex.").
328. See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 327, at 234, 246-50 (reporting that only
one child in a sample of fifty-five children with stepfathers fully substituted the stepfather for their
father; for the remainder of the children, stepparents were less powerful determinants of emotional
well-being than the absent biological parent).
329. See STANLEY COOPERSmrrH, THE ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-ESTEEM 81-117, 149-263
(1967) (analyzing relationship between parental attitudes and practices and their children's self-
esteem); Ner Littner, The Importance of Natural Parents to the Child in Placement, 54 CHILD
WELFARE 175, 178-81 (1975) (discussing advantages to foster children of contacts with natural
parents). See also sources cited supra note 326.
330. See DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF
71-82, 101-10 (1992) (reporting that even a child adopted at birth feels a sense of loss for biological
family); Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of the Search, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF ADOPTION 62 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990) (reporting that adopted
persons search for essential connections to their past).
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child support obligation,33' it is no accident that it has instead spurred a
new wave of interest in child support. We cannot afford to disregard
parental obligation; the consequences, to our children and to our
society, simply loom too large.
Because of the centrality of the parent-child relationship, the
child's inability to alter its quality, and the neutrality of a community
approach-which does not prefer the child's interests to those of the
parent but simply places them on an equal footing-a community
approach is, in my view, fully justifiable. But to the extent that concerns
relating to one or another difference between parenting and marriage
leave the rule-making authority unprepared to adopt a community
support model mandating full equality, the limited equality model,
reliant on a community norm but offering greater deference to the
noncustodial parent, is available. This approach, which might be
justified based on the continuity of the parent-child relationship,332 still
offers substantial improvements over both current guidelines and the
autonomy approach in terms of child support outcomes.
For all the changes in family relationships, Americans continue to
rank family obligations as the most important obligations333 and view
tougher child support laws as an effective means of strengthening
families and family values.3" It is no accident that family policy
dominates political discourse and family relationships the daytime talk
shows. Families come first. They are the world into which we are born,
the relationships that transcend inclination, and the setting in which we
learn commitment and responsibility. Because we prize those
commitments and responsibilities, a community support model may yet
garner broad public acceptance, as an accurate representation of our
331. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 318, at 1632-33; Krause, supra note 318, at 181.
332. While about 90% of consumption expenditures in an intact family are for joint goods--the
car, house, telephone and electricity that are utilized by all family members, see supra notes 133-135
and accompanying text-parents in an intact family can choose inequality for at least some family
expenditures; they may decide, for example, to leave the children with grandparents for two weeks
and take a lavish-adult only-vacation.
333. See GLEN)ON, supra note 227, at 105 (describing results of survey commissioned by
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company in which most respondents ranked "[b]eing
responsible for your actions," and "[b]eing able to provide emotional support to your family," as their
most important personal values while "[b]eing free of obligations so I can do whatever I want to do"
came in last).
334. See Hart & Teeter Research Companies National Telephone Survey of 1502 Adults for
NBC News and Wall Street Journal, Question 59 (June 17,1994) (reporting that, in response to
question on effectiveness of "several actions the government might take to try to strengthen families
and family values," 49% of the respondents rated "tougher laws to help collect money from parents
who do not make their child support payments" as "very effective," and an additional 19% rated
them as "fairly effective").
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familial ideals33 and as a reflection of our mutual stake in tomorrow's
generation.
CONCLUSION
A just child support law will conform to our considered judgments
about fairness among family members and the scope of parental
obligation. Current child support laws prefer the interests of the
nonresident parent to those of the child, the custodial parent, and the
public. Awards calculated under existing guidelines typically improve
the living standard of the child support obligor, while ensuring that that
of his child plummets. Many guidelines also fail to ensure that children
are protected from poverty, even when parental income is adequate to
meet that goal. The guidelines fail to achieve fair results under any
contemporary account of distributive justice.
Those accounts of distributive justice all lead to one of two child
support models. The "Community Model" bases the support
obligation on family membership and mandates income sharing as a
basic approach. The "Autonomy Model" bases the support obligation
on both the societal burden produced by nonsupport and the
nonsupporting parent's contractual obligations to the custodial parent.
It mandates public assistance (or poverty) prevention and contract
enforcement as basic goals.
The community support model appears to meet current public
policy goals better than does the autonomy approach. It satisfies the
poverty prevention aims of the autonomy model and does a much better
job of increasing support awards, the goal that motivated the guidelines
movement in the first place. Based on the sparse evidence available, the
community model more closely corresponds to public opinion trends.
Perhaps more importantly, it appears to comport with evolving family
law and cultural norms better than does the autonomy approach.
An autonomy-based perspective has strong rhetorical appeal, but
fails to capture the complexity and contradictions of contemporary
culture. Americans may favor individual property entitlements and
clean relational breaks, but they also expect parents to make sufficient
provision for their children that they do not burden the public; they
view the family as an intimate association based on sharing, not a
collection of autonomous individuals without obligations to each other.
On balance, the case for a community child support principle is a strong
one.
335. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 297, at 107 (reporting strict equality and need as norms within
nuclear family).
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